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PETITIONS, PRIVACY, AND POLITICAL OBSCURITY 
Rebecca Green* 
People who sign petitions must accept disclosure of their political views. This 
conclusion rests on the seemingly uncontroversial (if circular) premise that petition 
signing is a public activity. Courts have thus far shown little sympathy for individuals 
who take a public stand on an issue by signing a petition and then assert privacy 
claims after the fact. Democracy, after all, takes courage, as Justice Scalia wrote in the 
petitioning disclosure case Doe v. Reed. But signing a petition today brings 
consequences beyond public criticism. The real threat of disclosure for modern petition 
signers is not tangible harassment, but the loss of “political obscurity” in a modern 
data architecture that exposes citizens to indelible Internet scrutiny and rampant 
political preference cataloguing. This Article argues that political obscurity is an 
important, unarticulated interest in the current discourse about privacy and 
petitioning. Courts and state administrators must take steps to protect it or risk 
drastically diminished participation in petition signing. Finally, this Article suggests 
that political obscurity has important implications in other areas of political 
participation. For example, those who contribute small amounts to political campaigns 
and petition signers may share a similar privacy interest. “Drop-in-the-bucket” 
political gestures ought not extinguish political obscurity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A citizen’s right to petition the government has a long pedigree. Likewise, courts 
and commentators have flagged the right to privacy for decades. Until recently, the two 
rights coexisted. In the digital age, however, as our zones of privacy constrict, political 
privacy faces an assault from petitioning norms (and court opinions) that fail to 
acknowledge new technological realities. Perhaps the assault on political privacy will 
not threaten petitioning activity. Maybe citizens will continue signing petitions even 
when doing so today may radically expand exposure of their political preferences. But 
if political privacy does matter, if the reaction to amplified exposure in petition signing 
does dissuade people from signing petitions, a basic part of our political process will be 
threatened.1 If political privacy does matter to petition signers, failure to protect it 
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1. Cf. Raymond J. La Raja, Does Transparency of Political Activity Have a Chilling Effect on 
Participation? 1 (2011) (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Mar. 31–Apr. 3, 2011), available at http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/publications/does-transparency-
political-activity-have-chilling-effect-participation (arguing that decreasing anonymity has a chilling effect on 
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could take the legs out from underneath a right so central to our democratic construct 
that it is enshrined by name—unlike the right to privacy—in the text of the First 
Amendment. 
The modern battlefield for privacy rights in petition signing has been waged most 
prominently over same-sex marriage petitions and whether or not signers must “out” 
their political views to their communities when they sign petitions against gay 
marriage. The leading case is Doe v. Reed,2 in which Washington State anti–gay 
marriage petition signers tried to prevent the release of their names after several 
organizations sought access to the filed petition through the state’s Public Records 
Act.3 Activists circulated the petition, R-71, to repeal by public referendum a newly 
minted law, which expanded the rights of same-sex couples.4 The plaintiffs worried 
when ominously named organizations like WhoSigned.org and KnowThyNeighbor.org 
signaled intent not only to publish petition signers’ names and home addresses online, 
but also attach home phone numbers and online maps providing directions to petition 
signers’ homes.5 The plaintiffs feared this targeted Internet dissemination would 
“effectively become a blueprint for harassment and intimidation.”6 The Reed plaintiffs 
likened this threat to that faced by members of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) during the Civil Rights Era in a case that 
involved exposure of its membership lists.7 
The comparison came under fire in scholarly circles and in the media.8 The harms 
 
political participation).  
2. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).  
3. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.56.010–42.56.904 (West 2012). Referendum proponents must file a 
petition with the Secretary of State containing valid signatures of registered Washington voters “equal to or 
exceeding four percent of the votes cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election.” WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 1(b), (d). “A valid submission requires not only a signature, but also the signer’s address and 
the county in which he [or she] is registered to vote.” Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 29A.72.130). 
4. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816. The effort ultimately failed and voters approved the law by a margin of fifty-
three percent to forty-seven percent. S. 5688, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).  
5. Id. at 2816, 2820; Jessica Geen, Groups Threaten to Publish Names of US Gay Rights Opponents, 
PINKNEWS (June 9, 2009, 11:53 AM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/06/09/groups-threaten-to-publish-
names-of-us-gay-rights-opponents/; Carlos Santoscoy, Gay Rights Group To Post Names Of R-71 Petition 
Signers, ON TOP (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.ontopmag.com/article.aspx?id=9834&MediaType 
=1&Category=26#.  
6. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2820. 
7. See Brief for Petitioner at 32, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559), 2010 WL 711186 (arguing district 
court error for failure to consider the problem of government “facilitation of intimidation by compelling 
disclosure” as articulated in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)). 
8. For example, Joseph Birkenstock, an attorney at Caplin & Drysdale and former chief counsel of the 
Democratic National Committee, noted the traditionally high harassment bar set at the start of the civil rights 
era, when those who fought disclosure feared being hanged. Explained Birkenstock: 
If you look at the disclosure exemptions that have been recognized in the past . . . like for the 
NAACP in Alabama in 1957, . . . . [y]ou had strange fruit hanging from Southern trees. That’s not 
happening now. 
. . . I’m not arguing in favor of harassment, but I’m just saying there is kind of a continuum that has 
been present in the past that isn’t there today. 
Michael Beckle, Court Battles over Campaign Finance Disclosure Loom, Legal Experts Predict, OPEN 
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befalling civil rights activists were real, including loss of employment and all-too-
imminent threats to physical safety.9 In 2010, anti–gay marriage sentiment was barely a 
minority view in Washington State; the risks of harm were speculative.10 Thus, it came 
as no surprise when the Court proclaimed that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm 
according to the formula developed in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson11 over fifty 
years ago: a “reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure [of personal 
information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals.”12 In the eight to one 
opinion, only Justice Thomas found the threat of harassment to the Washington petition 
signers facially compelling.13 Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, admonished that 
signing a petition is a “political act[] [that] fosters civic courage.” 14 Without civic 
courage, Scalia warned, “democracy is doomed.”15 
A year later, on remand, the as-applied challenge met a similar fate.16 Plaintiffs 
tried to muster examples of requisite threats and harassment under the NAACP test, but 
the federal district court found the evidence lacking.17 One plaintiff, Matthew Chenier, 
testified that when he waved an anti–gay marriage banner in a high-traffic area he got 
an angry text message from his brother, and an unidentified passenger in a passing car 
“mooned” him.18 Dmitry Kozlov testified that while gathering signatures, a man 
“directed expletives at him and pushed him;” that another man, “threw garbage at [his] 
group from a van” (no injuries reported); that a woman told him “we’ll do everything 
to stop what you’re doing;” and that another man said “we’ll have your kids.”19 
Whatever one thinks of the gravity of these asserted harms as a harbinger of what 
might transpire upon public release of signatures, an odd fact remains: not a single 
plaintiff or witness in the as-applied challenge shied from using their real names in the 
suit.20 In a case suing to protect the privacy of petition signers, there was a notable lack 
 
SECRETS BLOG (March 20 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/03/court-battles-over-
campaign-disclos.html (quoting Joseph Birkenstock). 
9. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, given the sustained violence against African American civil 
rights activists in the South, the Supreme Court accepted the “uncontroverted showing that on past occasions 
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of 
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.” 357 U.S. at 462. 
10. Voters in Washington were nearly equally divided on the issue. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816 (“The 
voters approved SB 5688 by a margin of 53% to 47%.”). 
11. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
12. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1978) (per curiam)). The 
Buckley Court explained that this standard can be met upon a showing of the type harassment that occurred in 
NAACP, which included “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 69.  
13. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
14. Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
15. Id. 
16. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212–13 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
17. Id. at 1204–10. 
18. Id. at 1205. 
19. Id. at 1207. 
20. For example, Plaintiff Richard Long stated that he had “no problem testifying publicly in this matter” 
and that his involvement with the petition drive against gay marriage in Washington “need not be kept secret.” 
Id. at 1206.  
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of concern about the actual plaintiffs’ or witnesses’ privacy. Quite to the contrary, 
virtually all of the plaintiffs and witnesses were vocal and public opponents of gay 
marriage.21 Plaintiff Ronald Perkins (named in the suit as “John Doe #1” despite his 
willingness to use his real name), for example, shouted his opposition to same-sex 
marriage far and wide in an Internet video.22 Roy Hartwell (“John Doe #4”) testified 
about the petition before the Washington State Legislature, gathered signatures for the 
petition in public places, and participated in television interviews regarding the effort.23 
Pastor Ken Hutcherson, a long-time opponent of gay marriage, testified that Googling 
his name “results in approximately 300,000 hits related to his stance opposing gay 
marriage.”24 The individuals that the Reed plaintiffs used to document “harm” all took 
a very public stance on gay marriage. Is it any wonder that plaintiffs’ call for privacy in 
petition signing rung hollow? 
The Reed plaintiffs and witnesses were outspoken public opponents of gay 
marriage for a reason: the plaintiffs’ only hope to satisfy the NAACP standard required 
cataloguing the harms that befell opponents of gay marriage—those at the public heart 
of the debate.25 But the strategy proved problematic. It is difficult to muster sympathy 
for the Reed plaintiffs’ privacy interests after they made their political beliefs so 
publicly known. If one holds a politically provocative sign on a crowded sidewalk and 
gets mooned by those who disagree with its content, one should expect no less; after 
all, democracy takes courage.26  
The privacy interests of those who hold their political views closer to the vest are 
missing from the Reed narrative. What if the real (and much more difficult to 
document) harm befell those who did not—or would not—sign the petition? What if the 
harm in releasing petition names is not to activists being mooned or shouted at as they 
advocate publicly for their cause? What if the real privacy victim is a mother of two, 
passing a petition circulator entering the grocery store, fearful that signing a petition—
even for a cause in which she very much believes—might create a lifelong indelible 
association with that cause on her Internet record? In applying a harassment-based 
harm standard lifted from the 1950s, courts miss the very real and changed nature of 
the privacy problems petition signers (actual or prospective) face today.  
At first glance, it may be hard to muster sympathy for political privacy in the 
Internet Age. Throngs of Americans undertake online political activism every day. The 
Internet enables mass mobilization of political sentiment on an unprecedented scale.27 
Yet, as our political identities are increasingly exposed online, the act of signing an 
official petition has real—and lasting—privacy consequences. In an era of radically 
 
21. See id. at 1205–10 (listing opponents to gay-marriage referendum and their actions in opposition).  
22. Id. at 1205. 
23. Id. at 1206. 
24. Id. at 1206–07. 
25. See id. at 1199 (describing the “Exacting Scrutiny” standard required for the plaintiffs’ claim). 
26. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Requiring people to stand 
up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”). 
27. See Molly Beutz Land, Networked Activism, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 218–20 (2009) (providing 
examples of online activism); Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the 
First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121 (2001) (describing how the Internet 
has developed into the dominant form of communication and organization for social movements). 
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expanded exposure, petition signers today experience a deeply troubling loss of what 
this Article terms “political obscurity.” Until very recently, those who wanted to shield 
their political preferences from broad exposure could rely on an information 
architecture that made it very difficult for the political views of ordinary citizens to be 
exposed on a broad scale.28 The vast majority of citizens, in other words, enjoyed 
political obscurity. No more. Technology threatens political obscurity in ways that 
backwards-looking courts and legislators have largely failed to appreciate. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Section II introduces the concept of political 
obscurity, laying out its basic parameters and situating it in the scholarly dialogue 
about information privacy in the digital age. Section III analyzes the danger that 
modern technology poses to political obscurity. Section IV examines petitioning in the 
United States, outlining its modern incarnations with particular attention to the 
information architectures and privacy protections (or lack thereof). Section V makes 
the normative claim that courts, legislators, and state administrators should take steps 
to protect political obscurity in petitioning, suggesting a path forward to ensure 
transparency in the petitioning process without sacrificing vital political privacy rights. 
Finally, this Article concludes that recognizing a right to political obscurity for small-
scale political acts has broader application. 
II. POLITICAL OBSCURITY 
Political obscurity refers to individual control over the scope of public knowledge 
about one’s political preferences.29 As democratic citizens, we all have various 
tolerances for exposing our political views to others.30 Some prefer to make their 
personal political views well known, whether it is plastering their cars with bumper 
stickers, standing on street corners with signs, or blogging on forums under their real 
names. Most, however, prefer to keep some (or all) political views private.31 Whether 
 
28. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 863 (2010) (“[T]he changing nature of journalism and the maturation of the 
internet continue to intensify the effect of disclosure on ordinary political participants.”). 
29. This is a play on the term “practical obscurity.” For a review of the phenomenon of practical 
obscurity in the court records context, see Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic 
Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135, 152–53 (2009), and infra Section V. Deborah 
Johnson, Priscilla Regan, and Kent Wayland define practical obscurity as “the work involved in obtaining 
access and duplicating information [with] . . . the effect of protecting the privacy of the information.” Deborah 
G. Johnson et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 960 
(2011). They continue, “[i]n the networked world, those built-in protections are removed and there is little or 
no obscurity. Records can be easily accessed, searched, analyzed, and reconstituted in new forms from nearly 
anywhere in the world.” Id. 
30. According to a study published in 1996, less than one percent of surveyed cars displayed at least one 
bumper sticker declaring support for or identification with a political group. James W. Endersby & Michael J. 
Towle, Tailgate Partisanship: Political and Social Expression Through Bumper Stickers, 33 SOC. SCI. J. 307, 
314 (1996); see also David J. Koch & Douglas V. Porpora, Political Bumper Stickers and Vehicle Class: Are 
SUVs the Enemy?, in SIGNS OF WAR: FROM PATRIOTISM TO DISSENT 17, 20 (Anne-Marie Obajtek-Kirkwood & 
Ernest A. Hakanen eds., 2007) (“[I]n the United States, political messages constitute a relatively marginal 
percentage of all bumper stickers.”). 
31. See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 
943 (2011) (discussing the advent of the secret ballot as a mechanism “to enhance citizen independence and 
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the preference for political obscurity is professional, personal, or cultural, most 
Americans do not display political bumper stickers and do not stand on street corners 
with signs.32 
The term political obscurity imports into the political context a concept initially 
developed to describe privacy protections built into pre-Internet court records systems 
by virtue of the practical difficulty of accessing paper court records.33 The Supreme 
Court first recognized “practical obscurity” in the 1981 case United States Department 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.34 In Reporters Committee, 
the Court found that CBS News did not have a right of access under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA)35 to a federal criminal “rap sheet” of Charles Medico, an 
individual under media scrutiny for alleged mob activities.36 The sought-after 
information could be located in public court records, documents that CBS could have 
retrieved with great time, money, and effort by searching through dusty court files in 
courthouses across the country.37 But the federal government maintained computerized 
criminal records database containing Medico’s criminal history records in one 
convenient place.38 Reporters Committee examined whether Charles Medico possessed 
a right to “practical obscurity” that would preclude the media from easy access to state-
held criminal information about him.39 The Court found in Medico’s favor, 
acknowledging that technology dramatically impacted the privacy interests at issue.40 
Wrote Justice Stevens, “both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy 
 
sincerity by freeing voters to vote their actual preferences rather than those of a party to which they felt 
beholden or that they feared”). Many of us share this preference. Echoing my own sensibilities, election law 
scholar James Gardner writes of the prospect of having his own political preferences being broadcast on the 
Internet, “I don’t like that at all.” Id. at 927. 
32. Or even vote, as signaled by the low voter turnout in the United States compared to other developed 
democracies. See Rafael Lopez Pintor et al., Voter Turnout Rates from a Comparative Perspective, in VOTER 
TURNOUT SINCE 1945: A GLOBAL REPORT 75, 78–79 fig. 11 (2002) (ranking the United States 120th 
internationally in voter turnout between 1945 and 2001; averaged over seventeen elections).  
33. See Winn, supra note 29, at 152 (noting that while records in a pre-Internet, paper-based system are 
technically public, it offers a considerable amount of protection based on the “sheer difficulty of accessing it”). 
For a detailed definition of the term “political obscurity,” see infra Part II.A.  
34. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). Nancy Marder examined the relevance of Reporters Committee in the political 
context, specifically comparing court records and campaign finance disclosure. Nancy S. Marder, From 
“Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
441, 441–43 (2009). 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
36. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63. 
37. Id. at 764. 
38. The dissenting judge in the circuit court recognized the distinction between gathering information 
through hardcopy court files and computerized databases when he noted, “computerized data banks of the sort 
involved here present issues considerably more difficult than, and certainly very different from, a case 
involving the source records themselves.” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
831 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting), rev’d, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).  
39. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762. Notably, Reporters Committee was not a constitutional case. 
Medico’s privacy interests were expressed by FOIA’s exemption 7(C) which excludes records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, “but only to the extent that the production of such [materials] . . . 
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. at 756 (alteration 
in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)). 
40. Id. at 764. 
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encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”41 
Stevens continued: “The substantial character of that interest is affected by the fact that 
in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that would 
otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person attains age 80, when the 
FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.”42 
The concept of political obscurity introduced here builds on the Reporters 
Committee understanding of Mr. Medico’s privacy interest. It has long been recognized 
that some measure of privacy is required for democracy to function.43 I argue that 
political obscurity is an essential component of that function. The Parts that follow 
describe political obscurity, provide examples of the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
the right in First Amendment jurisprudence, and explore its fate in the Court’s 
petitioning cases.  
A. The Contours of Political Obscurity: What It Is and What It Isn’t 
The nature of political obscurity has never been fully examined; the concept has 
never, to this Author’s knowledge, been formally identified or defined.44 This Part will 
therefore endeavor to establish its parameters and identify its scholarly precursors. 
Political obscurity refers to the state of one’s political preferences being shrouded 
or otherwise difficult to discern or distinguish by others. A person enjoys political 
obscurity when she can go about her day as she so chooses without others perceiving or 
otherwise determining the nature of her political views. The politically obscure person 
is able to control and manage the extent of disassociation from the political views she 
holds (or once held) or political actions taken in the present and in the past. 
Political obscurity is related to, but broader than, anonymity. We have long 
understood political anonymity to describe the masking of one’s identity in political 
discourse. Political obscurity may be accomplished through the use of anonymity—
masked identity on chosen political platforms (online or in the real world). But 
throughout history most people enjoyed political obscurity without masking their 
identities. Political obscurity is far more commonly achieved by choosing not to share 
political views at all, or by sharing in a purposefully limited sphere enabled by an 
information/data poor environment.45 Political obscurity therefore describes a broader 
right than anonymity: it is the fundamental right to exist without one’s political 
preferences being continuously recorded and, consistent with the right articulated in 
 
41. Id. at 763. 
42. Id. at 771. 
43. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 4 
(R. McCallum ed., 1946) (observing that while public expression of political opinion is a hallmark of 
democracy, some privacy is needed in order to prevent the government from oppressing those with certain 
political views); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 24 (1967) (“Just as a social balance favoring 
disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a balance that 
ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance is a 
prerequisite for liberal democratic societies.”). 
44. That said, numerous observers have acknowledged that the modern information landscape 
fundamentally changes the privacy landscape for ordinary political actors. See infra notes 57–60 and 
accompanying text for further discussion on the Internet’s impact on behavior in the real world. 
45. McGeveran, supra note 28, at 863. 
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Reporters Committee, a right against state-facilitated cataloguing of one’s political 
preferences.  
One’s preference for political obscurity need not be absolute. Citizens may desire 
or expect to remain politically obscure on some issues but not others. A vocal critic of 
the war in Afghanistan, for example, may prefer her views on abortion remain private. 
Political obscurity is likewise not the same thing as a desire for total secrecy of one’s 
political positions. One’s political preferences may be well known to family and 
friends, larger groups within one’s community, or even one’s whole geographic 
locality.46 A person suffers a loss of political obscurity, however, if she were forced to 
reveal her political preferences in spheres in which—had she total control—she would 
choose not to.47 
Time affects political obscurity. Political obscurity can be achieved not just by 
confining the scope of one’s political activities, but also by the natural passage of time 
through which one’s public political activities fade and are forgotten.48 Until recently, 
time served as a reliable means of ensuring individual political obscurity. 
The observation of technology’s threat to political obscurity grows out of a 
vigorous privacy dialogue scholars have engaged in since the rise of the networked 
world. When the Internet arose, scholars immediately recognized its potential as a rich 
new platform for democratic debate.49 But scholars quickly recognized the downsides: 
technology’s erosion of personal privacy and the potential for that erosion to chill 
political speech.50 Early observation focused predominantly on the Internet itself as a 
potential forum for democratic discourse.51 Would this new space replace or  
re-energize the public square? As these discussions unfolded, observers identified 
online privacy as a threat to this new deliberative space.  
Paul Schwartz, one of the first such commentators, wrote Privacy and Democracy 
in Cyberspace in 1999. Schwartz noted that political participation in the real world is 
not like political participation online: on the Internet, a digital record of your online 
 
46. By “community” here, I am not necessarily referring to community in a geographic sense. Indeed, 
one’s community in the modern world can include far-flung individuals one has never met. 
47. One illustrative example that comes to mind is Oliver Sipple. In 1975, Sipple prevented Sarah Jane 
Moore from assassinating President Ford in San Francisco. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 
666 (Ct. App. 1984). The San Francisco Chronicle and other news outlets ran stories about his heroic act. Id. 
The articles identified Sipple as a prominent member of San Francisco’s gay community, a fact Sipple had not 
shared with his family back home in Detroit. Id. Sipple sued, asserting tort violation of his privacy through 
publication of private facts about him. Id. at 667. The court was unsympathetic, noting that “there can be no 
privacy with respect to a matter which is already public.” Id. at 669. Sipple fell prey to a loss of relative 
obscurity. 
48. This temporal aspect of practical obscurity in the court records context carried the day in Reporters 
Committee, where the Court noted that “the ordinary citizen surely has a similar interest in the aspects of his or 
her criminal history that may have been wholly forgotten.” 489 U.S. at 769. 
49. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1648 
(1999) (indicating that “[c]yberspace has the potential to emerge as an essential focal point for communal 
activities and political participation”). 
50. See id. at 1647–53 (analyzing how privacy concerns on the Internet will discourage participation and 
deliberation in democracy). 
51. Id. at 1650. 
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movements is recorded.52 According to Schwartz, preserving the Internet as a truly 
open marketplace of ideas would require rules that maintain some measure of control 
over one’s digital footprints.53 
The following year, Julie Cohen echoed the theme, advocating for individuals’ 
control over information about them online. Cohen noted that individual autonomy 
plays a central role in development of democratic personhood.54 Cohen was concerned 
that a “no privacy” environment would hamper informed and deliberate self-
governance online.55 A robust debate, she wrote, “requires the opportunity . . . to keep 
distinct social, commercial, and political associations separate from one another.”56 
Early observers like Cohen and Schwartz zoomed in on the need for individual 
autonomy and control of personal information in cyberspace. 
Later, scholars began to address the Internet’s impact on behavior in the real 
world. Daniel Solove, in his 2007 book The Future of Reputation,57 recounted a vivid 
example: a girl on a Korean subway who neglected to clean up after her dog faced real 
consequences when a video of her lapse went viral online.58 Our right to control 
information about us, Solove observed, is exacerbated by the free speech rights of 
others and the free flow of information online.59 Solove’s work underscored the impact 
of this phenomenon on democratic discourse. Those who feel nervous about 
overexposure of political views, he noted, might refrain from engaging in democratic 
debate.60 
Wrestling with the problem Solove and others identified, scholars and 
policymakers have been toying with the idea that the right to control information about 
us extends to the right to delete. In his 2009 book on the subject, Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger argued: “As digital memories make possible a comprehensive 
reconstruction of our words and deeds, even if they are long past, they create not just a 
spatial but a temporal version of Bentham’s panopticon, constraining our willingness to 
say what we mean, and engage in our society.”61 Mayer-Schönberger’s solution is to 
invoke an individual right to delete information stored about us—online and 
 
52. Id. at 1651 (“Listening to ideas in Real Space generally does not create a data trail, listening on the 
Internet does.”). 
53. Schwartz used the term “self-determination” to describe individual control of data regarding their 
identity. Id. at 1653. Self-determination, he wrote, “should be defined as people who, as part authors of their 
lives, substantially shape their existence through the choices they make.” Id. at 1655. 
54. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373, 1425 (2000) (“[T]he benefits of informational autonomy (defined to include the condition in which no 
information is recorded about nonanonymous choices) extend to a much wider range of human activity and 
choice . . . . The opportunity to experiment with preferences is a vital part of the process of learning, and 
learning to choose, that every individual must undergo.”). 
55. Id. at 1426–27. 
56. Id.  
57. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007). 
58. Id. at 1–4. 
59. Id. at 2. 
60. Id. at 131. 
61. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 197 
(2009).  
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elsewhere.62 This call for digital forgetting has resonated in the United States and 
abroad.63 The European Commission, for example, is currently considering a 
controversial proposal to include the “right to forget” in its data privacy laws.64 
The concept of political obscurity builds this dialogue. Stopping far short of 
mandated digital forgetting, the call to respect citizens’ right to political obscurity asks 
the state to remove itself from the role of facilitating online dissemination of 
information that reveals our political preferences. 
B. Political Obscurity and the Court 
The Supreme Court has not formally recognized a right to political obscurity. This 
is unsurprising. Since the founding of this nation until very recently, time and 
information inefficiencies safeguarded the political obscurity of the vast majority of 
Americans. But the Court has consistently policed the role of the state in disclosing 
political identity, affirming that the right to political privacy is firmly rooted in core 
First Amendment political self-determination and personal autonomy rights. 
1. Political Affiliation—Cold War and NAACP 
State-mandated political identity disclosure cases litter Supreme Court history, 
most predominantly during the Cold War Period, and in other periods of pronounced 
political strife.65 Many such cases involved a prying state and the desire of citizens to 
avoid classification that could draw hostile reaction from the state and/or members of 
the public. Particularly during the Cold War, when state actors attempted to rout 
“subversive behavior,” the Court played a central role in protecting against forced 
disclosure of political identity.66 
In addition to Cold War Era political privacy cases, the Court’s right of 
association jurisprudence confirms the constitutional commitment to protecting against 
state-facilitated disclosure of one’s political preferences.67 The seminal associational 
 
62. Id. at 135. 
63. Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts has authored a bill, for example, that would require 
erasure of online records on children. Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011).  
64. Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond 8–9 (Sept. 21, 2012) 
(unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032325 (discussing key provisions in the European 
Commission’s proposal for a regulation regarding the processing of personal data and the free movement of 
such data).  
65. For a thorough review of disclosure cases during the Cold War, see Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, 
Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 7–10 (1991). 
66. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254–55 (1957) (overturning on due process 
grounds contempt conviction for refusal to answer questions regarding petitioner’s political beliefs); United 
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,42 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If the lady from Toledo can be required to 
disclose what she read yesterday and what she will read tomorrow, fear will take the place of freedom in the 
libraries, bookstores, and homes of the land.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (finding the First 
Amendment protects the right “fully and freely to discuss and be informed concerning this choice, privately or 
in public assembly”).  
67. See William O. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1372–83 (1963) 
(detailing the threat to the right of association protected by the First Amendment posed by legislative 
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rights case NAACP provides an example.68 In NAACP, the Attorney General of 
Alabama brought suit against the civil rights group for failing to comply with a state 
statute requiring “foreign” (i.e., non-Alabamian) corporations to register with the 
Secretary of State.69 During litigation, the State moved for production of a large 
number of NAACP documents, “including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records 
containing the names and addresses of all Alabama ‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the 
Association.”70 The NAACP eventually turned over all of the documents except for its 
membership lists and subsequently suffered a contempt judgment for failing to comply 
fully with the production order.71 The NAACP’s chief argument was that compelled 
disclosure of the membership lists violated the group and its members’ right of free 
association.72 
The Court found in favor of the NAACP and the political privacy interests of 
current and potential NAACP members (recognizing that without ensuring the 
“collective privacy” of the group, the NAACP would be unable to draw new 
members).73 The Court understood the crucial link between protecting privacy in 
political belief and ensuring public political participation.74 NAACP therefore strikes at 
political obscurity’s core: it cements the right of individuals to define and control zones 
of political activity in order to ensure such political activity takes place. Implicit in 
right of association cases is political obscurity: the recognition that individuals must be 
free to define the spheres in which their political identity travels. 
2. Political Anonymity—McIntyre 
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,75 the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of an Ohio statute requiring citizens distributing political literature to 
include their names, ultimately protecting Mrs. McIntyre’s right to distribute her 
 
investigative committees). 
68. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (using the standard from NAACP); Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 985–86 (2011) (“[T]he key [step in associational privacy rights] 
from the point of view of modern law, was the Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama.”); Stephen Clark, 
Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 542 (2003) 
(describing NAACP v. Alabama as one of the “foundational cases” in associational privacy); Edward J. Eberle, 
The Right to Information Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965, 979 (2001) (“NAACP v. Alabama, 
decided amidst the civil rights struggle, is the leading case on group privacy and associational rights.”). 
69. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451–53; accord Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 
(1982) (challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions in the “Ohio Campaign Expense 
Reporting Law”); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (challenging an Arkansas municipality ordinance 
demanding a local branch of the NAACP to give city officials a list of their members).  
70. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 453.  
71. Id. at 453–54. 
72. Id. at 458–59. 
73. See id. at 462–63 (“[C]ompelled disclosure of petitioner’s Alabama membership is likely to affect 
adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they 
admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and 
dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations 
and of the consequences of this exposure.”).  
74. Id. at 462. 
75. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
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pamphlets anonymously. McIntyre is therefore widely cited for its pronouncements on 
anonymity.76 But the case also has a lot to say about political obscurity. First, although 
Mrs. McIntyre resisted the requirement that she put her name on all of her handbills, 
she put her name on many and indeed distributed many handbills herself in plain view 
of others.77 McIntyre is therefore very much about the scope of information release—
specifically, Mrs. McIntyre’s ability to control how many people knew she was the 
author of her pamphlet.78 What bothered Mrs. McIntyre was the State of Ohio forcing 
her to reveal her identity on a broader scale than she preferred.79 In that sense, the right 
to political obscurity is central in the case. 
One feature that unites Cold War Era political privacy cases and McIntyre is the 
absence of technology as a central element of the case. These cases exist in an ink-and-
paper world. Looming databases, computer-aided information sharing, and the Internet 
are largely irrelevant to the cases that provide the basis for political privacy rights in 
this country.80 The Court has addressed technology-enhanced disclosure in several 
nonpolitical contexts. Although there have been glimmers of recognition that 
technology dramatically alters the disclosure balance, Reporters Committee being a 
prime example,81 most cases have held that amplified disclosure through placement on 
a computer database or on the Internet does not materially impact the outcome.82  
3. Location Obscurity—Jones 
One case from the 2012 Supreme Court Term suggests an evolving understanding 
of the value of obscurity as it relates to technological advance. A concurring opinion in 
 
76. See, e.g., Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2005).  
77. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337 (“Some of the handbills identified [Mrs. McIntyre] as the author; others 
merely purported to express the views of ‘CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS.’ Except for the 
help provided by her son and a friend, who placed some of the leaflets on car windshields in the school parking 
lot, Mrs. McIntyre acted independently.”). Justice Scalia uses Mrs. McIntyre’s signing her name to a subset of 
her handbills as evidence that she did not fear NAACP-style threats or harassment, entirely missing the more 
subtle point that Mrs. McIntyre sought the ability to control the scope of disclosure. Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
78. See id. at 342. 
79. See id. at 355 (distinguishing mandatory disclosure of political expenditures from compelled self-
identification on all election-related writings).  
80. Doe v. Reed, however, is an exception. See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Doe v. Reed. 
81. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J. concurring) (“The central storage and 
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not 
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such 
technology.”). 
82. See, e.g., id. at 600 (majority) (“We are persuaded . . . that the New York program [creating a 
computer database of individuals prescribed Schedule II opiates by their doctor] does not, on its face, pose a 
sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation.”); Nat’l Aeronautics & 
Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 763–64 (2011) (refusing plaintiffs’ claim that databasing of 
information gleaned from government background checks would subject employees to possible disclosure of 
sensitive personal information); Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) (“Mere 
injury to reputation [due to posting of sex offenders’ personal information on an online sex offender  
registry] . . . does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest.”). 
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the Fourth Amendment case United States v. Jones83 (involving twenty-four-hour GPS 
surveillance) suggested that members of the Court may be increasingly sensitive to the 
issue of technology-enhanced disclosure of personal information.84 Wrote Justice 
Sotomayor:  
I would take [the] attributes of GPS monitoring into account when 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in 
the sum of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably 
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner 
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. I do not regard as dispositive 
the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring 
through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.85  
Sotomayor went on: “[m]ore fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”86 Though she did not use the word, Sotomayor is 
arguing for a right to obscurity. Sotomayor recognizes that while we may share 
information about ourselves in limited spheres—walking down the street, a limited 
group of others may see us pass and take note of our movements—technology-
enhanced disclosure fundamentally changes the equation.87 Similarly, when we 
disclose information about our political preferences in limited spheres of our choosing, 
the state’s use of technologies that take that choice away and amplify disclosure 
beyond what we intend violates the right to political obscurity. 
With these musings in mind, the next Part focuses on the Court’s handling of the 
right to prevent disclosure of political identity in the petition context up to and 
including Reed. The Court’s treatment of political obscurity in petition cases reveals a 
puzzle: its importance is recognized in pretechnology cases but is oddly undervalued in 
the technology-driven case of Reed.  
C. Political Obscurity and Petitions 
The first cases to discuss one’s ability to control information about political 
preferences in petitioning centered not around the privacy interests of petition signers, 
but around those of petition circulators. In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Inc. (ACLF),88 the State of Colorado placed restrictions on petition 
circulators, including the requirement that each wear a name badge bearing their true 
 
83. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
84. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by 
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may ‘alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”). 
85. Id. at 956. 
86. Id. at 957. 
87. See id. at 954–57 (drawing a distinction between societal expectations of disclosure of public 
movements and technology-enhanced surveillance by the government).  
88. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Throughout this Article, I will refer to Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Inc. as ACLF as it is commonly known throughout legal scholarship. I will, however, continue to 
cite the case using the title as is appears in the United States Reports.  
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name.89 The plaintiffs argued that the requirement dramatically reduced the ranks of 
those willing to circulate petitions.90 Explained a veteran political organizer testifying 
in the case, “[t]he badge requirement . . . ‘very definitely limited the number of people 
willing to work for us and the degree to which those who were willing to work would 
go out in public.’”91  
Like McIntyre, ACLF is most often cited as an anonymity case.92 Forcing 
circulators to wear name badges felt the same as requiring Mrs. McIntyre to affix her 
name to her pamphlets a few years earlier—a plain-vanilla matter of forced identity 
disclosure. But ACLF, like McIntyre, is a strange brand of anonymity. The circulators, 
after all, were not masked. Anyone who recognized the petition circulators would learn 
of their political preferences on the subject of the petition being circulated. By not 
wearing name badges, circulators maintained a desired degree of political obscurity. 
Requiring circulators to wear name badges forced them to expand the scope of 
disclosure of their political preferences (and thanks to the registration requirement, that 
scope expansion included exposure to state cataloging).  
The Court’s analysis in ACLF is somewhat scattered. At points, the Court noted 
concern for NAACP-style retaliation and harassment.93 But in the end, the Court did not 
require proof of potential or actual retaliation or harassment to reach its conclusion.94 
The decision comes down to the Court’s concern for maintaining high levels of 
political participation.95 Wrote the Court, “Colorado’s current badge requirement 
discourages participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name 
identification without sufficient cause.”96 Forcing name identification, in other words, 
dilutes political obscurity to the detriment of democratic functioning. 
 
89. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 186.  
90. Id. at 195–96. 
91. Id. at 198. 
92. See, e.g., Gayle Horn, Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and 
the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735, 767 (2005) (“In Buckley v. American 
Constitutional Law Foundation, the Supreme Court extended this right to anonymity to the circulation of 
petitions . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf Is not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis 
of the Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
527, 571 (2002) (“In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the Supreme Court again 
considered the right of anonymity in the context of political speech.”); Darryl R. Wold, Tell Us Who You  
Are - Maybe: Speaker Disclaimers After Citizens United, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 171, 186 (2011) 
(“The Court again visited the issue of anonymity in political speech in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation (‘ACLF’).”). 
93. For example, the Court cited testimony indicating the “reluctance of potential circulators to face the 
recrimination and retaliation that bearers of petitions on ‘volatile’ issues sometimes encounter: ‘[W]ith their 
name on a badge, it makes them afraid.’” Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 198 (alteration in 
original).  
94. Id. at 200. 
95. Id. at 198–200. 
96. Id. at 200; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) 
(holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring door-to-door canvassers obtain a license from the town). 
Watchtower Bible did not concern a name badge requirement, but the Court echoed ACLF’s concern for 
contained political identity. “In the Village, strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and 
the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.” Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. 
at 167.  
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After McIntyre and ACLF, some believed the Court would continue to prefer 
individual political privacy rights over disclosure.97 Boy, were they wrong!98 In the 
petition context, Doe v. Reed heralded what seemed to be an about-face. The Reed 
Court (and the court below in the as-applied remand) ignored the value of political 
obscurity. The Court, in large part due to the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy,99 rested its 
decision on the question of retaliation.100 If the State of Washington released signers’ 
names, would signers then be exposed to NAACP-style threats and retaliation? For 
reasons discussed in the introduction, the answer was a resounding no.101 
A second ground to deny the plaintiffs’ plea for privacy in petition signing was 
the public nature of the act itself. Justice Scalia’s concurrence hammered this point 
home.102 Consistent with his prior writing on the subject,103 Scalia rejected outright that 
a right to privacy even exists in petitioning, which he argued is at its core a legislative 
act.104 Scalia meticulously documented the history of petitioning in public, from open 
town hall meetings in colonial New England, to reading petitions aloud in Congress in 
1790, to the roots of the progressive direct democracy movement in the early 1900s.105 
In the history of this country, and indeed for centuries before in European antecedents, 
the right to petition the government never included the right to petition privately.106 
Scalia therefore finds the idea that a privacy right might attach to the public act of 
petitioning preposterous.107 For Scalia, political obscurity does not exist. You are either 
fully in or fully out.108 
What Scalia and the majority missed, however, is that history is largely irrelevant 
 
97. McGeveran, supra note 28, at 859–60.  
98. McGeveran recently noted that he previously had tracked a trend of what he believed might be “a 
more capacious understanding of the interests in anonymity when ordinary individuals engage in politically-
related speech.” Id. at 859. By 2011, after Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, McGeveran wonderfully laments, 
“[b]oy was I wrong.” Id. at 860. 
99. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2814 (2010) (“The problem for plaintiffs is that their argument 
rests almost entirely on the specific harm that would attend the disclosure of information on the R–71 
petition.”). 
100. Id. at 2817–20. 
101. Id. at 2821. (“Faced with the State’s unrebutted arguments that only modest burdens attend the 
disclosure of a typical petition, we must reject plaintiffs’ broad challenge to the PRA.”). See supra Part II.C 
for a discussion of the Reed Court’s treatment of the speculative harm to plaintiffs.  
102. See id. at 2833–36 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the history of public voting and 
legislating). 
103. E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371–85 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
104. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2832–33 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our Nation’s longstanding traditions of 
legislating . . . in public refute the claim that the First Amendment accords a right to anonymity in the 
performance of an act with governmental effect.”). 
105. Id. at 2834. (citing STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE 1-3, 5 (2003)). Scalia also reviews 
the history of a cousin of petitioning: casting of ballots, which until later in U.S. history, Scalia notes, was 
considered a public act. Id. at 2834–36.  
106. See infra notes 148–52 and accompanying text for discussion of the history of petitioning in the 
United States.  
107. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2834–36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (chronicling the history of public disclosure 
in federal governmental functions). 
108. See id. at 2836–37 (concluding that the Constitution does not impose any secrecy requirement upon 
the states).  
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to the true harm suffered in Reed. Technological threats to political obscurity not 
present in the past are at the core of the case.109 Pre-Internet, those who signed 
petitions might have expected that the petition circulator or others signing the same 
page of the petition might see their name. Signers would expect that government 
officials might verify the validity of their signature. The possibility vaguely loomed 
that concerned citizens might pore over the pages of paper signatures looking for fraud. 
But, due to the paper-based information architecture, petition signers of old had no 
expectation that the government would affirmatively publicize their signature in a 
permanent, searchable format (for the simple reason that, until recently, no means to do 
so were available). Petition signers could rely on the political obscurity that exists in a 
paper-based information architecture. Today, however, petition signing is experiencing 
a fundamental shift. The Section that follows examines how profound the shift is. 
III. THE MODERN THREAT TO POLITICAL OBSCURITY 
We now live in a society with a perfect digital memory; the Internet does not 
forget.110 Petition signers in Reed tried to convey this, expressing fear of “economic 
reprisals,” not just in the form of firing from their current job or boycott of businesses 
in real time.111 In a world without political obscurity, repercussions loom indefinitely. 
What is the real cost of signing petitions when doing so potentially creates a permanent 
record of one’s political beliefs in the everlasting memory of the Internet? 
A. The Modern Political Data Infrastructure 
Over the course of a digital citizen’s lifetime, a variety of organizations compile 
an increasingly broad spectrum of data about him.112 Information about spending and 
saving habits, consumer product preferences, home ownership, and a wide swath of 
other forms of data, are regularly compiled into dossiers used for a wide variety of 
purposes.113 An entire industry has arisen devoted to culling, tracking and selling huge 
 
109. Alito’s concurrence emphasized the Internet’s potential for making personal information available 
to be used for harassment. Id. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring). Alito noted the NAACP link between privacy and 
political participation, worrying that compelled disclosure of names on petitions could “burden the ability to 
speak,” and thereby “seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 2822 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). Alito rejected the facial challenge, but suggested these rights could 
well be vindicated through an as-applied challenge. See id. at 2824 (finding “courts should be generous in 
granting an as-applied relief in this context”). Although he joined the majority, Alito worried that invading 
privacy interests of petition signers might, “chill the willingness of voters to sign” a referendum petition (and 
thus the circulator’s ability to collect the necessary number of signatures). Id. at 2822.  
110. See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 61 (discussing the paradigmatic shift, caused by 
information technology, from forgetfulness to perfect memory). 
111. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 10–11 (outlining the evidence of intimidation against 
petitioners).  
112. The “digital person,” does not just refer to individuals who spend time online, but increasingly even 
those who do not and yet still find their real world activities catalogued by digital information gatherers. See 
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
(2004) (discussing how various organizations monitor our habits on the Internet and the threat to our privacy 
as a result).  
113. Daniel Solove is one of the first and most prolific writers to identify and dissect the impact of this 
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amounts of information about people from individual consumer preferences, to Internet 
browsing histories, to location data.114 Some studies suggest that consumers do not 
much care when companies track their preferences for marketing purposes.115 Others 
indicate that perhaps consumers are starting to care.116 
But the dramatic increase in political data aggregation practices in the past twenty 
years suggests that political privacy norms—namely, that citizens maintain relative 
control over the flow of information about their political preferences—are changing 
fast.117 Data that reveals our political preferences and activities has become a valuable 
commodity for a variety of end users including, but not limited to, those seeking to 
sway political outcomes through a variety of voter targeting efforts.118 
Before computers, state parties and individual campaigns developed relatively 
crude databanks on voters and campaign donors collected through voter phone calls 
and door-to-door canvassing.119 This information might include the voter’s candidate 
 
trend. See id. at 16–26 (discussing how data collection captures almost all Internet activity but is difficult for 
the average Internet user to appreciate). Solove explains:  
As we live more of our lives on the Internet, we are creating a permanent record of unparalleled 
pervasiveness and depth. Indeed, almost everything on the Internet is being archived. One company 
has even been systematically sweeping up all the data from the Internet and storing it in a vast 
electronic warehouse. Our online personas—captured, for instance, in our web pages and online 
postings—are swept up as well. We are accustomed to information on the web quickly flickering in 
and out of existence, presenting the illusion that it is ephemeral. But little on the Internet disappears 
or is forgotten, even when we delete or change the information. The amount of personal information 
archived will only escalate as our lives are increasingly digitized into the electric world of 
cyberspace. 
Id. at 26. See also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 163–
65 (2000) (discussing the efforts of advertisers to gather information from Internet users); Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society, Joel R. Reidenberg on Transparent Citizens and the Rule of Law, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
(Feb. 1, 2010), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interactive/events/lawlab /2010/02/reidenberg (exploring the 
erosion of the boundary between public and private information on the Internet). 
114. See SOLOVE, supra note 112, at 17–22 (describing the development of the direct marketing and 
database industries).  
115. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), 
at 30 (describing how retailers create predictive models from data on consumer habits unbeknownst to the 
consumer).  
116. One study found that sixty-six percent of Americans say that they do not want their information 
used to target consumer products to them. Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and 
Three Activities that Enable It 3 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214. When participants in the study were told how companies would target them 
(through their activity on the website, through activity on other websites, and through their offline activity), 
between seventy-three and eighty-six percent said that they would not want such advertising. Id.  
117. See Daniel Kreiss & Philip N. Howard, New Challenges to Political Privacy: Lessons from the 
First U.S. Presidential Race in the Web 2.0 Era, 4 INT’L J. OF COMM. 1032, 1035 (2010) (discussing the 
diminution of traditional political privacy as political participants share personal information).  
118. See SOLOVE, supra note 112, at 20 (describing companies that specialize in compiling demographic 
and voting data); cf. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1406–09 (2001) (explaining the historical rise in targeted 
marketing).  
119. See Philip N. Howard & Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative Perspective, 15 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article /view/2975/2627 (warning about the harmful 
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preferences, top issues of concern, and the voter’s activist history (such as whether the 
voter has volunteered as a precinct captain or whether the voter had served as a poll 
worker). In many states, a basic building block of campaign voter data files came from 
the state in the form of state voter registration and voter history data.120 But these early 
efforts at sourcing political data in public records and campaign outreach efforts are 
quaint compared to the newest iterations of the practice. As the information revolution 
has unfolded, political data mining efforts have become extraordinarily 
sophisticated.121 
Beginning in the 1980s, the Republican Party began using consumer data, 
particularly commercial data such as credit card records and magazine subscription lists 
to target voters and identify prospective donors.122 After the 2004 election, the 
Democratic Party began to outsource political data mining to private companies to 
streamline, update, and expand voter file data.123 In 2008, the Democratic Party and the 
Obama campaign, aided by a long, multistate Democratic primary battle, helped the 
Democrats build a centralized voter file dubbed the Voter Activation Network.124 
Senator Al Franken’s win in Minnesota in 2008 is widely credited to Democrats’ 
sophisticated political data aggregation effort.125 In that recount, election lawyers used 
the Democrats’ voter data profiling to predict ballot outcomes as a means of honing its 
 
effects of increased data mining in the political context); Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1035 
(explaining how “powerful advances in computing during the 1970s made data management skills and raw 
datasets stored on mainframes newly bankable assets for consultants and parties”); Daniel Kreiss, Yes We Can 
(Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political Data, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 70, 71 (2012) 
(discussing “the history of political data, focusing on the recent proliferation in voter data and development of 
new voter modeling techniques”).  
120. Twenty-nine states currently outlaw the commercial use of voter registration lists. This includes 
allowing third parties to use the lists for commercial reasons. Kim Alexander & Keith Mills, Voter Privacy in 
the Digital Age, CAL. VOTER FOUND. (last updated Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.calvoter.org/issues 
/votprivacy/pub/voterprivacy/findings.html. Twenty-two states have no restraints on use of voter data and 
allow unrestricted use of voter registration files. Id. 
121. Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1035–36 (noting that while the Democratic Party initially 
lagged behind in these efforts, it has pioneered recent efforts to collect data from supporters since 2008).  
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1036. 
124. Id.; cf. Noah Rothman, Republican National Committee to Outsource Voter File, CAMPAIGNS & 
ELECTIONS, May 23, 2011, http://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/Republican-National-
Committee-to-Outsource-Voter-File (discussing the Republican National Convention’s plan to share its voter 
file with independent groups). According to Kreiss & Howard, the Obama campaign  
continually analyzed user behavior on its Web site and made minor adjustments in design and 
content that increased the percentage of citizens who signed up for its e-mail list and donated 
money. Together, the electoral databases maintained by the Democratic National Committee and by 
the private firm Catalist, in conjunction with a vast array of online behavioral and relational data 
collected from use of the campaign’s website and third-party social media sites such as Facebook, 
provided the Obama campaign with data on more than 250 million Americans. 
Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1033.  
125. JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: HOW AL FRANKEN WON THE MINNESOTA RECOUNT 133 (2010) 
(“More than once, voting officials and Coleman reps witnessed Franken lawyers check with staff members—
‘computer geeks’ . . . —who sorted through voter data information on their laptops. In a few cases, the staffer 
with the computer gave a thumbs-up or thumbs-down to the Franken lawyer, and a decision was made.”).  
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successful litigation strategy.126 
Since then, companies have proliferated, advertising the ability to identify and 
target voters for campaign donations, get out the vote efforts, and customized mailing 
(and emailing and social network) campaigns.127 Others, through increasingly 
sophisticated software, are marketing the ability to identify patterns of voter behavior 
and taste believed predictive of voter decision making.128 Whether they are political 
data mining outfits or “digital political advertising” firms, the basic idea is that 
sophisticated data profiling of individual voters—from cars they drive to websites they 
visit to the traffic tickets they incur—allows campaigns not only to identify potential 
supporters, but to customize the message to that individual voters receive based on their 
data profile.129 Companies like CampaignGrid on the conservative side and DSPolitical 
and Precision Network on the liberal side promise to make every campaign dollar go 
towards hitting the right voters with the right message.130 Aggressive political data 
efforts marked the 2008 campaign on both sides, with very little if any oversight on 
collection practices and use of collected voter data.131 
For the most part, voters remain clueless about the extent and sophistication of 
political data collection and use.132 Just before Mitt Romney in 2012 announced his 
running mate, CNN broadcast that anyone who downloaded the Romney campaign’s 
“mobile app” would receive word of the running mate pick in advance.133 What most 
did not realize, however, is that downloading the mobile app created a treasure trove of 
 
126. Id. 
127. Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1036–39.  
128. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 112, at 20 (discussing software that implements advanced methods 
for predicting how individuals will vote). 
129. Colin Delany, Voter File Digital Ad Targeting: Reality vs. Hype, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, 
July/Aug. 2012, at 20.  
130. Id. Daniel Solove, for example, described how a political data marketer called Aristotle maintains a 
“Fat Cat” list it sells to candidates with the following pitch: “Hit your opponent in the Wallet! Using Fat Cats, 
you can ferret out your adversary’s contributors and slam them with a mail piece explaining why they 
shouldn’t donate money to the other side.” SOLOVE, supra note 112, at 20. GeoVoter, Solove notes, “combines 
about 5,000 categories of information about a voter to calculate how that individual will vote.” Id.; see also 
McGeveran, supra note 28, at 873–75 (expressing concerns for diminished privacy rights as a result of new 
digital dossiers).  
131. See Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1041–42 (noting the lack of transparency around political 
campaign use of data and lack of regulation, largely due to First Amendment free speech protections 
campaigns enjoy). Rampant inaccuracies in political data streams are starting to cause problems that are likely 
to increase in frequency. Id. at 1042. Problems associated with corrupted voter data are proliferating. Id. at 
1042–43. During the 2012 election in Virginia, for example, an organization mailed voter registration forms 
with prepopulated and allegedly inaccurate voter data belonging to deceased individuals, pets, and non-
citizens. Wesley P. Hester, Romney Camp Asks Va. to Probe Voter Forms, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, July 
25, 2012, at A1. 
132. See Kreiss & Howard, supra note 117, at 1041 (finding that few citizens are aware of contemporary 
campaign practices because they are generally hidden from the public). 
133. Campaigns Debut Mobile Apps, CNN (July 31, 2012, 8:34 AM), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/31/campaigns-debut-mobile-apps/ (“Team Romney’s app, called 
‘Mitt’s VP,’ will send a notification to users when the candidate is ready to announce his vice presidential 
selection. The campaign said the app would be the ‘first official distribution channel’ for the big reveal.”). 
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data for the Romney campaign.134 Explained one report on the privacy implications of 
mobile apps,  
Smartphones are often on and tethered to their user, transmitting rich data to 
the app developers. Users of mobile devices are vulnerable to privacy 
intrusion and abuse by numerous entities, app developers, analytic services 
and advertising networks. These entities could have access to sensitive 
information, including a user’s location, contacts, identity, messages and 
photos. Without a privacy policy [which very few mobile apps include], 
what companies do with the personal data they collect is largely invisible to 
consumers.135  
A final observation about political data mining relates specifically to petitioning. 
Unlike other data points such as the cereal one eats, one’s age, or one’s history of 
volunteering for political campaigns, petition data is particularly revealing. Other data 
points might lead campaigns and others to hypothesize about voting preferences 
through sophisticated algorithms and guesswork. The resulting predictions may 
pinpoint voter preferences exactly or be way off. Petition signing data, however, is far 
more fine-tuned and invasive of political obscurity. Like a ballot, it may reveal the core 
content of their political identity.136 
Rampant political data mining creates a climate unlike anything democracy has 
known. Political obscurity is fast becoming a thing of the past—and without most 
voters realizing it. Current petition practices feed the data deluge collected on ordinary 
people’s political preferences. This may be of great concern to some; others might 
shrug it off. The next Part reviews the pros and cons of diminishing political obscurity 
in petitioning. 
B. Political Obscurity and Petitioning: Should We Care? 
Growing empirical evidence suggests that waning political obscurity threatens 
petitioning.137 In one study, researchers asked subjects how likely they were to sign a 
 
134. Id. 
135. Press Release, Cal. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. 
Harris Secures Global Agreement to Strengthen Privacy Protections for Users of Mobile Applications, (Feb. 
22, 2012). Joseph Lorenzo Hall recently pointed out the issue of campaigns collecting voter data through 
mobile apps in a post on the Election Law Listserv. Joseph Lorenzo Hall, ELB News and Commentary (July 
31, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://department-lists.uci.edu/pipermail/law-election/2012-July/004332.html (responding 
to Richard Hasen’s observation—that the Obama campaign uses the cell phone number Hasen provided to 
send campaign-related text messages—by explaining that a mobile app allows campaigns to collect far more 
information). 
136. There are at least two reasons to step back from this statement. First, as discussed infra Part IV.A, 
many petition signers (in the case of nonofficial online petitions) do not use their real name. Still, this does not 
ensure that identity is not traceable. See Allesandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security 
Numbers from Public Data, 106 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10975, 10975 (2009) (describing the 
technological feasibility of combining bits of data to determine identity). Second, signing a petition does not 
always indicate political preference. For example, initiative petitions involve whether or not a particular issue 
should be put to voters; signers of such petitions may not be expressing a political preference other than a 
belief that voters should take it up at the next election.  
137. La Raja, supra note 1, at 1 (arguing that decreasing anonymity has a chilling effect on political 
participation).  
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petition in support of a candidate or cause they believed in, even if that candidate or 
cause was unpopular with friends or coworkers.138 Researchers then asked those 
respondents how likely they were to sign a petition that is posted publicly on the Web 
in support of a cause or candidate they believed in, but was unpopular with friends and 
coworkers.139 When respondents were told that their signatures would appear on the 
Internet, their willingness to sign a petition dropped by 8.5%.140 If people believe they 
have lost control over the scope of disclosure of their political preferences, they may 
become very wary of disclosing those preferences at all.141 
Despite these trends, some might argue if some people decline to sign citing 
privacy concerns, these are minor casualties; the new data architecture aids the 
democracy by enhancing accountability.142 We cannot have a deliberative democracy 
without citizens actively pronouncing their views and being accountable to those 
views.143 The supporters of gay marriage in California, like those in Washington State, 
 
138. Id. at 13. 
139. See id. at Abstract. (“[Our] findings indicate that . . . people are less willing to sign a petition when 
they believe the petition will appear on the Internet. Important differences exist for women and cross-pressured 
citizens. The results imply that disclosure policies regarding . . . petition signers involve social costs that 
negatively affect political participation.”).  
140. Id. at 17. 
141. It bears mention that data overexposure pollutes the petitioning process in other ways as well. In 
2011, a group called Californians Against Identity Theft and Ballot Fraud aired radio advertisements warning 
California voters that signing petitions could expose them to identity theft. Torey Van Oot, Californians 
Against Identity Theft Files as Campaign Committee, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 3, 2011, 12:43  
PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2011/08/californians-against-identity-theft-campaign-
committee.html. The group warned that information from petitions could be used to perpetrate identity theft 
and that names on petitions have already been sent overseas for nefarious uses. Paul Jacob, Crying Fire in a 
Crowded Democracy, TOWNHALL (July 31, 2011), http://townhall.com/columnists/pauljacob/2011/07/31 
/crying_fire_in_a_crowded_democracy/page/full/. The group cited the rise of paid canvassers, often recruited 
among indigent populations, as further evidence that signatures are at risk. See id. (referencing a group 
member who called petition circulators “paid bounty hunters”). The group backed its claims with references to 
the lack of regulation of California official petition-signature gatherers. Unions Targeted by Ballot Petitions 
Counter Campaigns, GOERIE.COM (July 31, 2011, 7:23 AM), http://www.goerie.com/apps/pbcs.dll 
/article?AID=/20110731/NEWS07/307319898/-1/ETN. Most outside groups, including Common Cause, have 
expressed their belief that the ad was created to provoke fear and to keep Californians from signing petitions. 
Nikki Willoughby, Intimidation Tactics in California, COMMONBLOG (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.commonblog.com/2011/08/01/intimidation-tactics-in-california/. Given the backing of labor 
unions, particularly the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California, some outsiders have 
suggested that the group’s ads are targeted at potential pension reform referenda. Unions Targeted by Ballot 
Petitions Counter Campaigns, supra. The sponsors of the group, however, have defended its warnings as 
targeted to better regulate the signature-gathering industry within California, citing incidents of deceptive 
practices by paid canvassers. Id. A similar incident occurred in Michigan. The MI GOP Freakout Cont’d: 
Robocalls Warn Against Identity Theft, Daily Kos (Aug. 11, 2011, 5:15 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story 
/2011/08/19/1008542/-The-MI-GOP-freakout-cont-d-Robocalls-warn-against-identity-theft-from-signing-
petitions-AUDIO-link. 
142. See DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX: WHY THE 21ST CENTURY CALLS FOR MORE 
OPENNESS–NOT LESS 201 (2004) (“Life in a global village is likely to impact our lives significantly as events 
normally hidden from the public eye become transparent, forcing people to take more accountability for their 
actions.”).  
143. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the need for people 
to “stand up in public” for their views in order for democracy to function). 
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wanted to post petition signers’ names and addresses with Google map directions 
precisely because they hoped to encourage those who stood for gay marriage to 
challenge those who opposed it.144 This is how America works. We debate. We 
confront. Too much political obscurity makes it impossible for such confrontation and 
debate to take place.145 Those “tough conversations,” the argument goes, are valuable 
to democracy. 
What this position overlooks, however, is that without some measure of political 
obscurity we will have far fewer individuals to hold to account. To the extent that 
“outing” petition signers drives would-be petition signers away from petition 
clipboards, we may never know who supports or opposes what in a post-political 
obscurity world. We will still know the political preferences of those who stand very 
publicly behind their convictions. Indeed, there will always be vocal and public 
supporters of causes who court, and even enjoy, broad and lasting political exposure. 
But, what if the vast majority of citizens who value political obscurity simply 
withdraw? Reduced participation in petitioning may well have negative impact on other 
forms of political participation, such as contributing to political campaigns and even 
voting.146 
A second criticism of the idea that fading political obscurity will erode 
participation in petitioning is that far from dampening participation, technology 
facilitates political participation on a scale never before imagined.147 Anyone who has 
picked up the newspaper in the last year knows that online petitioning efforts have 
Change.org’ed the world. Perhaps the general population does not value political 
obscurity, as evidenced by the millions who seem undeterred by threats to privacy 
online petitioning may present.  
To assess these claims, the following Section examines the trends of the two 
dominant forms of modern petitioning: official and popular petitioning. Section IV will 
examine the nuts and bolts of modern petition signature collection and processing with 
particular attention to the fate of political obscurity in each.  
IV. MODERN PETITIONING 
Petitioning in the modern day is in many ways thriving, meeting if not exceeding 
the Founders’ expectations for public participatory democracy.148 Petitioning in the 
United States takes two primary forms: “official” petitioning and “popular” petitioning. 
 
144. Marder, supra note 34, at 450.  
145. See, e.g., Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Requiring people to stand up in public 
for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”). 
146. Cf. Janine A. Parry, et al., The Impact of Petition Signing on Voter Turnout, 34 POLIT. BEHAV. 117, 
132 (2012) (establishing through empirical study that petition-signing significantly enhances voter turnout, 
particularly among irregular voters.) 
147. See La Raja, supra note 1, at 7 (highlighting research on the impact of “the Internet on politics”).  
148. Despite the proliferation and popularity of online popular petition sites in the last few years, pre-
Internet petitioning in the preceding several decades witnessed a steep decline. Using data from Roper Political 
and Social Trends Survey (1973-1994), Robert Putnam describes the steep drop in political participation in this 
country generally, and petition signing specifically, in his 2000 book on U.S. political (in)activism. ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 30–46 (2000). 
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Here, official petitioning refers to those instances in which the state requires petitioning 
as part of a legislative, judicial, or administrative process. A common example of 
official petitioning is a state’s requirements for gathering a specified number of 
signatures to place a candidate on the ballot.149 
Official petitioning also includes petitions circulated in support of direct 
democracy—the process of citizen legislating that enables voters to pass statutes and 
constitutional amendments via the ballot box.150 Currently, about half of U.S. states 
have adopted some form of direct democracy.151 Thus in many states official 
petitioning takes on an important role in the legislative process.152 
Popular petitioning, by contrast, refers to spontaneous petitioning activities by 
members of the public to arouse support for a particular cause or call for specific 
action.153 Popular petitioning has played a central role in political participation 
throughout U.S. history, particularly in moments of political and social upheaval.154 
Popular petitions, as described here, carry no legal effect; they seek to inform and alert 
decision makers who must then recognize and perhaps contend with a potentially 
sizable group.155  
Popular petitioning and official petitioning serve separate functions and are 
 
149. See Leonard P. Stark, You Gotta Be on It to Be in It: State Ballot Access Laws and Presidential 
Primaries, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 137, 140–41 (1997) (“Most states require candidates seeking a place on the 
ballot to gather petitions signed by registered members of the candidate’s party. The number of required 
signatures varies from 500 statewide to more than 1000 in each of a state’s congressional districts.”). 
150. John Gildersleeve, Editing Direct Democracy: Does Limiting The Subject Matter of Ballot 
Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1438–39 (2007). Direct democracy takes 
two main forms: initiatives (mechanisms that allows voters to propose a statute or state constitutional 
amendment first by gathering a requisite number of petition signatures to place the measure on the ballot) and 
referendums (mechanisms by which voters may challenge a measure enacted by a state legislature, again 
triggered by a minimum petition signature requirement). RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE 
INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 3–4 (2002). Direct democracy first arose during the Progressive Movement 
in the late 1800s when citizens began calling on direct popular input to combat perceived legislative practices. 
Id. at 26. Public opposition to industry-controlled state legislatures gave rise to a form of direct democracy, 
modeled on a democratic form in Switzerland, allowing citizens to vote directly on legislative matters. Id. at 
28. For a review of the history of Swiss direct democracy, see PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, 
LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 46–70 (1998). 
151. ELLIS, supra note 150, at 39.  
152. Justice Scalia saw this aspect of official petitioning—its role in the legislative process—as 
determinative. For Scalia, no privacy interests can attach to public legislative acts. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811, 2832 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. 
Reed and the History of Anonymous Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 2140, 2142 (2011) (arguing that petition 
signatures in referendums are solely legislative acts and should not be considered speech at all). 
153. Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of 
Grievance, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 153–54 (1986) (discussing various local uses of petitions by eighteenth-century 
colonists, including the following: (1) petitions to obtain public funding for programs to care for the sick, 
insane, and orphans; (2) petitions to voice the grievances of unrepresented groups, such as women and slaves; 
and (3) petitions to modify legislation concerning agricultural and commercial developments).  
154. For a detailed review of the role of petitioning in the United States, see generally Higginson, supra 
note 153, and Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L. J. 569, 585 
(1987).  
155. See Higginson, supra note 153, at 156 (explaining that while citizens cannot bind Congress, the 
First Amendment maintains that citizens’ petitions would be heard and considered). 
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carried out through distinctly different processes. The following Part starts with 
popular petitioning, offering a look at the basic forces in play and the fate of political 
obscurity in popular petition movements. 
A. Modern Popular Petitioning 
The Internet enables organizations to use online petition platforms to gauge public 
opinion and rally the public behind a cause quickly and virtually without cost. Building 
on this capacity, popular online petitioning platforms on which citizens (and 
noncitizens) can generate and sign online popular petitions are proliferating. 156 Topics 
range from: putting an immediate end to animal-tested cosmetics, abandoning the 
penny, requests to personally obtain medical marijuana, to withdrawing troops from 
Afghanistan.157 Online popular petitioning is not necessarily directed at government; 
often such efforts are meant to sway private sector behavior.158  
Nicholas Kristof documented the power of the online popular petition in a New 
York Times column.159 Kristof described how a group of fourth graders created a 
petition at Change.org to protest the lack of environmental focus on the Universal 
Studios website promoting its film The Lorax.160 According to the column, the petition 
gathered over fifty-seven thousand signatures and the studio promptly changed its 
website to include the environmental message the students had petitioned to add.161 
Countless examples suggest that the online petitioning platform has the power to create 
real results; it is a platform on which even a fourth-grade classroom can make change 
happen. 
But harnessing consumer power is not the last word in online petitioning. Online 
popular petitioning has become a huge force in the political realm as well. The 
response to the proposed federal Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in 2011 provides a 
good example. It featured an effort by Google, in which reportedly over seven million 
Americans petitioned Congress.162 Importantly, signers who took the time to find out 
 
156. Examples of popular U.S. online petitioning sites include Change.org, Care2, and iPetitions. See 
About, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (describing Change.org as 
“world’s largest petition platform, empowering people everywhere to create the change they want to see”); 
Start Your Petition, CARE2, http://www.thepetitionsite.com/create.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) 
(proclaiming Care2 as the “#1 petition site in the world,”); About Us, IPETITIONS, 
http://www.ipetitions.com/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (providing that “the power of the internet [is] to 
transform society and [iPetitions] places it in the hands of ordinary people”). 
157. See, e.g., WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/stop-all-animal-testing-
cosmetics-and-household-products/TLdmJKBy (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); WE THE PEOPLE, 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition /investigate-abandoning-us-1-cent-coin-penny/fWczx9cm (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2013); WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/please-help-tonya-davis-meet-
president-obama-her-last-wish-tonya-terminally-ill-and-needs-medical/jWGYBB1y (last visited Feb. 25, 
2013); WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/bring-all-troops-home-afghanistan-
december-31-2013/mnXBfssB (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
158. See, e.g., No NHL Lockout, IPETITIONS, http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/hockeyyinsiderr-no-nhl-
lockout/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (organizing a petition to end the NHL lockout). 
159. Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., After Recess: Change the World, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5, 2012), at 11. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. SOPA Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation Protests Continue, WASH. 
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how Google might use the personal information they entered (first and last name, email 
address, and zip code) learned through a pop-up prompt that Google would publish 
only signers’ first names and last initials, and might use email addresses to send 
“updates” on Google’s other policy initiatives.163 Google thus assured signers that their 
political obscurity would remain intact through the public display only of first name 
and last initial. (Nonetheless, Google admitted that it would hold on to email addresses 
for future unspecified purposes.164) 
Attempting to harness online political energies, the White House has joined the 
online petitioning bandwagon too.165 In September 2011, the White House launched a 
petitioning website called “We the People.”166 The site invites Americans to create and 
sign web petitions,167 which are then submitted directly to the White House.168 The 
White House pledges to respond to any petition that garners more than 25,000 
signatures in a thirty-day window.169 On some petitions, potential signers can see the 
names of others who have signed the petition, but the names are obscured to first name 
and last initial.170 
 
POST (Jan. 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-petition-gets-
millions-of-signatures-as-internet-piracy-legislation-protests-continue/2012/01/19/gIQAHaAyBQ_story.html. 
163. Take Action, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/takeaction (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). Clicking on 
the words “How we use your information” directly below the sign up box resulted in the following pop up: 
“The name that you give may be published publicly as part of this website and discussion. Your specified 
country and other location information may be used to display the vibrant conversation across the world. Your 
email address may be used to send you updates on Internet policy initiatives.” Id.  
164. Id. 
165. See We the People, WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) 
(reading on its main page “[g]iving all Americans a way to engage their government on the issues that matter 
to them”) Id.  
166. Id. 
167. Users must register and include their zip code, but the website does not require users to attest to 
their citizenship. Create a WhiteHouse.gov Account, WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/register 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013).  
168. Step by Step Guide, WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/how-why/step-step-guide (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013).  
169. Id. Petitions receiving responses from the White House range the full gamut of topics from re-
establishing and maintaining a separation between commercial and investment banks to “[r]eleas[ing] all non-
violent drug offenders” to “[a]ctually tak[ing] these petitions seriously instead of just using them as an excuse 
to pretend you are listening.” Michael K, Re-establish and Maintain the Separation Between Investment Banks 
and Commercial Banks, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 22, 2011), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/re-establish-
and-maintain-separation-between-investment-banks-and-commercial-banks/ywCMKDfn; Adela F, Release All 
Non-Violent Drug Offenders. Release All Inmates Who Are Incarcerated for Cannabis Related Crime, WHITE 
HOUSE (Oct. 3, 2011), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/release-all-non-violent-drug-offenders-release-
all-inmates-who-are-incarcerated-cannabis-related/tBvfwJC8; Scott S, Actually Take These Petitions Seriously 
Instead of Just Using Them as an Excuse to Pretend You Are Listening, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 28,  
2011), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/actually-take-these-petitions-seriously-instead-just-using-
them-excuse-pretend-you-are-listening/grQ9mNkN. According to Macon Phillips, Director of the White 
House Office of Digital Strategy, the site is fast gaining traction. Macon Phillips, We the People Update, 
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 4, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/04/we-people-3-million-
signatures-later. 
170. E.g., Michael K, supra note 169. The date of signing is also notated under the first name and last 
initial. The signer can indicate whether s/he would like to display city and state as well. Id.  
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Some criticize the White House platform as fluff, suggesting that it is no more 
than a public relations ploy.171 A cynic might wonder whether the personal data that 
We the People collects was used to assist Obama’s reelection (e.g., to gauge public 
opinion and identify potential supporters and critics).172 But the relative success of the 
effort (according to the White House, the site averages 406 signatures per hour) 
underscores the ability of the Internet to harness political dynamism.173 When 
compared to old-world petition signature gathering, there is no question that the 
Internet provides a previously unimaginable means to mobilize vast numbers of people 
quickly behind a cause. 
Despite these strides, and amidst growing skepticism about the real impact of 
popular online petitioning as a political force,174 the explosion of online popular 
petitioning does not necessarily indicate that individuals no longer value political 
obscurity. Several theories suggest that those who sign online popular petitions may not 
believe that signing threatens their political obscurity. First, many signers use fake 
identities when they sign online petitions. Because quality control and identity 
verification on online petitioning platforms are often weak, signers can sign online with 
created identities manufactured for the purpose. The signer may or may not be a 
citizen; the signer may or may not be of majority age.175 These theories are supported 
by the structure of many online petitioning websites and the fact that they require 
minimal identifying information when signing.176 For all we know Internet petitioners 
may be dogs.177 Most online petitioning sites include only flimsy mechanisms to verify 
 
171. See Joseph Marks, White House Defends We the People Petition Responses, NEXTGOV (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111104_3070.php (documenting generic White House 
responses to user allegations of indifference to the substance of petitions). 
172. Others note that, by its terms, the site does not require real government action. Often the official 
response to “successful” petitions is nothing more than a letter stating the Administration’s position. Id. 
According to the White House, as of September 4, 2012, 112 petitions crossed the threshold for response and 
twenty agencies/departments have authored responses. Phillips, supra note 169. 
173. See id. (discussing how the site’s popularity has “exceeded [White House] expectations”). 
174. Observers are starting to note downsides of online activism, suggesting that online petitions (and 
their cousins the mass-email campaign and campaigns that use social networking platforms like Facebook or 
Twitter) are “low-quality, redundant, and generally insubstantial commenting by the public.” Stuart W. 
Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. 
Federal Rulemaking, 1 POLICY & INTERNET 23, 26 (2009) (criticizing “the notion that online public 
participation is a harbinger of a more deliberative and democratic era.”); see also Evgeny Morozov, The Brave 
New World of Online Slacktivism, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 19, 2009, 8:11 AM), 
http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/19/the_brave_new_world_of_slacktivism (describing 
slacktivism as the “feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact”); Quentin Fottrell, 
Petitions: From Constitutional Right to Online Joke, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (December 27,  
2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-12-27/finance/36019500_1_online-petition-signatures-civic-act 
(describing online petitions that “more often veer off into frivolity or obscurity”).  
175. These theories are supported by the structure of many online petitioning websites and the fact that 
they require minimal identifying information when signing. See, for example, supra note 163 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the information one provides when signing a petition on Google’s Take 
Action website.  
176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text for a discussion of the information one provides when 
signing a petition on Google’s Take Action website.  
177. See Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61 (New Yorker cartoon captioned: “On the 
Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”). 
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identity—if true identity is verified at all.178 The incentive to create a buzz with an 
Internet petition cuts heavily against any need to ensure that petition signers are who 
they say they are.179 The ability to mask one’s identity is one major difference between 
online popular petitioning and official petitioning, which places specific requirements 
on who is allowed to sign, contains mechanisms for signature verification, and imposes 
fines and/or criminal penalties for fraud.180 
Second, for those who stand behind their identity on popular petitioning websites, 
it is unclear whether signers are aware that they are sacrificing political obscurity by 
signing. Online petition signers may not fully appreciate the uses of political preference 
data generated from such websites.181 How many of the hundreds of thousands of 
people who have signed petitions at Change.org, for example, know that the company 
turns its profit by selling their names to groups that might be interested in marketing to 
people with the political preferences they indicate by signing? By clicking “Change.org 
for Organizations” at the bottom of the main page, and then clicking on “Change.org 
Premier Partner Program,” the following plug to organizations interested in buying the 
names and contact information of Change.org petition signers appears: 
With Change.org’s advertising platform, we enable agencies, consulting 
firms, and direct marketing companies to provide their clients with high 
quality supporters at an unprecedented scale. As a member of the 
Change.org Premier Partner Program, your company can better serve your 
clients by providing them the very best in supporter acquisition while 
expanding your reach in the nonprofit ecosystem. 
A few great reasons to become a Premier Partner 
• Receive the most cost effective pricing for supporter acquisition 
with preferred pricing 
• Maximize your client’s ROI with the support of a dedicated 
 
178. Many online petition sites require signers to register in order to add their name to the petition, 
relying on terms of service notifications that signers agree to provide accurate registration information. See, 
e.g., Terms of Service, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/about/terms-of-service (last visited Feb. 25, 
2013) (“By using the Service or the Site, you represent and warrant that you are 13 or older and that you agree 
to and to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. . . . In consideration of your use of the 
Site, you agree to (a) provide accurate, current and complete information about you as may be prompted by 
any registration forms on the Site (‘Registration Data’) . . . .”).  
179. For example, in the SOPA petition, Internet activists encouraged non-U.S. citizens to create fake 
names and U.S. addresses to sign their petition. Gianluca Mezzofiore, SOPA: Anonymous Extends OpBlackout 
Protest to non-US Citizens, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk 
/articles/281259/20120113/sopa-anonymous-extends-opblackout-protest-non-citizens.htm.  
180. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§18600-14 (West 2012) (imposing a fine of not more than five 
thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for not more than three years); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §1-40-130(2) 
(West 2012) (imposing fine of not more than one thousand five hundred dollars and/or imprisonment for not 
more than one year); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §16-401 (West 2012) (listing offenses related to petitions). 
Note that using a false identity could result in negative consequences for breaching petition sites’ terms of 
service. E.g., Terms of Service, supra note 178.  
181. See Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2), available  
at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Misplaced-Confidences-acquisti-FPF.pdf 
(hypothesizing that individuals are less concerned about others’ eventual access to their personal information 
because the individuals control publication of that information).  
  
394 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
 
Change.org client strategist 
• Close more deals with the help of partner sales training, 
Change.org’s sales and marketing toolkit, and access to our direct 
sales team 
• Gain exposure to over 20,000 organizations using Change.org as 
their preferred action platform182  
If online popular petition signers realized that petition sites are selling data about 
their political preferences, would they be dissuaded from indicating political 
preferences on online petitioning sites? 
Third, other factors may explain why online petition signers—even those who use 
their real names and enter truthful personal information on online petitioning  
sites—feel that signing does not implicate their privacy interests. One may highly value 
political obscurity, but still subjectively believe that entering information on a 
petitioning website does not threaten it.183 Unlike paper-based petitions, popular 
petition sites seldom allow users to view the full names and addresses of others who 
have signed the online petition nor will future potential signers see theirs. Again, an 
examination of Change.org may be instructive, as it gives signers the option to check a 
box that reads, “[d]isplay my signature publicly.”184 The assumption, if the box is not 
checked, is that the political preference signaled by signing the petition will remain 
private.185 
In addition, unlike paper petitions most often circulated within a relatively 
circumscribed geographic area, online petitions are nationwide and in practice often 
exceed national boundaries.186 The large geographic scale of online petitioning 
increases signers’ sense of obscurity in a way paper petition signers do not experience 
when the circulator proceeds to the neighbor’s house next.  
Online petitioners also enjoy subjective privacy because no one else need witness 
their signature.187 The individual who signs in his living room may feel his petitioning 
 
182. Change.org Premier Partner Program, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/organizations 
/partners (  Nov. 16, 2012). 
183. For an interesting study of online website users’ false sense of privacy, see Brandimarte et al., 
supra note 181.  
184. Privacy Policy, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/about/privacy (last updated Oct. 25, 2012).  
185. Change.org automatically creates a user profile when an individual signs a Change.org petition. 
Terms of Service, supra note 178. Users who click on a “Settings” tab are given the option to select “Privacy.” 
Privacy Policy, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/about/privacy (last updated Oct. 25, 2012). The privacy 
settings do not allow users to restrict Change.org’s use of user data. Id. 
186. See Land, supra note 27, at 219 (describing Avaaz, an organization that uses technology and the 
internet to connect individuals across the world to influence global politics); About, supra note 156 (describing 
Change.org as the “world’s largest petition platform” with over 20 million users in 196 countries). See, e.g., 
Prosecute the Killer of Our Son, 17-year-old Trayvon Martin, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions 
/prosecute-the-killer-of-our-son-17-year-old-trayvon-martin (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (showing 2,278,304 
signatures from Canada, Thailand, and Hong Kong, among other places).  
187. Online popular petition platforms have great flexibility in deciding when and whether signers’ true 
identities are revealed. Some use this feature strategically. For example, on the UK website PledgeBank, users 
can pledge action only if others join. Users can pledge to start recycling if 100 people in their town do the 
same. See PLEDGEBANK, http://www.pledgebank.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (using the tagline “I’ll do it, 
but only if you’ll help”). The question of whether or not signers’ identifying information is revealed publicly, 
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activity is implicitly private—just as he might experience the requisite sense of privacy 
moments later when he enters his credit card data on Bed, Bath & Beyond’s website to 
purchase new towels for his bathroom. Even if political data aggregators have a field 
day with online petition data—a remote threat to the average person—online petition 
signers can sign petitions when they are alone.  
Subjective expectations of privacy are different when signing an online popular 
petition versus a real-world official petition; but this is starting to become less the case. 
As the next Part explores, new online forms of official petitioning may alter the privacy 
paradigm official petition signers’ experience. In addition, like online popular petition 
signers, those who put their name to official petitions increasingly subject their political 
identities to a vast state cataloguing system that all but destroys political obscurity. 
B. Modern Official Petitioning 
Official petitioning, by its nature, is meant to be a clunky process. Official 
petitioning rests on the assumption that petitions should be relatively rare and used only 
for grave and important matters.188 Official petitioning efforts must meet a certain 
threshold of toil to count; burdens on official petitioning function as a vetting 
mechanism.189 
Burdens on official petitioning come in many forms. Aside from establishing 
minimum thresholds for how many signatures successful petitions must contain,190 
states impose many other forms of restrictions such as residency and other 
requirements on petition circulators,191 and restrictions on petition content and form.192 
 
however, is much different than the question of what petition sites do with signer data. 
188. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191–92 (1999) (discussing the 
import of the state interest in imposing restrictions on the petitioning process in order to improve its 
reliability); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637, 
659–66 (1980) (discussing official restraints on petition signature gathering imposed to ensure integrity and 
accurate representation of public support).  
189. When Newt Gingrich and Rick Perry failed to get on the ballot in Virginia during the 2012 
Republican primary, many saw it as indication that they lacked the will and organization to be presidential 
candidates. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Gingrich Falls Short of Signatures Needed to Get on the Primary 
Ballot in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at A26.  
190. Some states have even toyed with geographic restrictions on the topic of numerical targets. See, 
e.g., Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding Equal Protection and First Amendment 
challenge to state ballot initiative geographic distribution requirement that proponents must obtain signatures 
from a number of registered voters equal to ten percent of the votes cast in the previous general election in 
each of the state’s congressional districts).  
191. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112 (West 2012) (requiring petition circulators, inter alia, 
to be a resident of the state and at least eighteen years old); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.06 (West 2012) 
(requiring circulators to be registered voters); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2869 (West 2012) (providing that 
petitions must have an affidavit attached saying the circulator is a registered voter and other information). 
192. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-4 (West 2012) (detailing the form requirements of a 
petition); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.544c (West 2012) (providing the exact form a nominating petition 
must take); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 250.015 (West 2012) (requiring the secretary of state to design prospective 
petitions); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2869 (West 2012) (prescribing specific formatting rules depending on 
type of candidate and whether multiple sheets are used). In one extraordinary recent example, the Michigan 
Supreme Court rejected a referendum petition because, though it contained enough valid signatures, the 
petition’s heading was not fourteen-point font as required by Michigan statute. Stand Up for Democracy v. 
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Once circulators submit a petition to the state, the state scrutinizes petitions for 
signature validity and reserves the right to reject petitions if state-imposed burdens are 
not met.193 Burdens on official petitioning are frequently challenged as overly onerous 
on First Amendment grounds: too many burdens on petition circulation violate the First 
Amendment much like overburdening citizens’ ability to distribute handbills.194 
In the past several decades, paid political consultants have taken a central role in 
official petition signature gathering. Many decry this development, worried that 
financial incentives have in many ways eclipsed “purer” political motivations.195 
Indeed signature gathering for official petitions has become a lucrative industry. 
Petition gatherers routinely earn one to four dollars per signature.196 One or sometimes 
multiple political consultants operate in virtually every state to orchestrate petition 
drives.197 Paying circulators for each signature they gather creates obvious incentive to 
forge names, “revive” deceased voters, or engage in other forms of fraud to get 
signatures.198 Accusations of petition fraud are not new to the petitioning landscape, but 
 
Sec’y of State, 822 N.W.2d 159, 181 (Mich. 2012).  
193. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.552 (West 2012) (providing extremely detailed rules for 
review, protests, and duties with regards to petitions); OHIO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3513.263 (West 2012) 
(providing that “[w]ritten protests against such nominating petitions may be filed by any qualified elector 
eligible to vote for the candidate whose nominating petition the elector objects to, not later than the seventy-
fourth day before the general election”).  
194. See, e.g., Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 779–81, 788–91 (1974) (challenging time limit 
and residency requirements for petitions); Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2009) (striking 
down residency requirement for petition gatherers); Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (striking 
down as too burdensome an Illinois petition law requiring independent candidates to obtain ten percent of the 
total votes in the previous general election to obtain ballot access). 
195. Joel Zuercher, Democracy for Sale: The Signature Gathering Industry, ACS BLOG (Aug. 20, 2004), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/democracy-for-sale-the-signature-gathering-industry; see also Daniel Hays 
Lowenstein & Robert M. Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting 
View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 175, 176 (1989) (discussing the outrage following the 
invalidation of a state law banning circulators paid to qualify ballot initiatives). But see Drew Fitzgerald, The 
Business of Signature Harvesting, SUN CHRON., (June 14, 2010), http://www.thesunchronicle.com 
/articles/2010/06/14/news/7490389.txt (noting that “throwing money” at an unpopular initiative does not 
necessarily deliver results).  
196. Fitzgerald, supra note 195. 
197. When Americans Elect sought (unsuccessfully) to place a third party on the 2012 presidential ballot 
through an online primary, it reportedly paid a company called Arno Political Consultants $10.1 million to 
gather signatures throughout the country. See Center for Responsive Politics, Americans Elect: Expenditures, 
2010 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_expends.php?ein 
=272285014&cycle=2010 (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (breaking down Americans Elect’s expenditures during 
the 2010 election cycle); Scott Moore, Americans Elect Part IV: Paying Big Money for Signatures, OUR 
OREGON (Sept. 29, 2011), http://thesockeye.org/2011/09/29/sockeyeblogamericans-elect-part-iv-paying-big-
money-signatures/ (providing a detailed report of Americans Elect’s expenditures for signature gatherers). For 
a variety of reasons, the effort imploded. See Chris Cillizza & Aaron Blake, Americans Elect and the Death of 
the Third Party Movement, WASH. POST (May 18, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the 
-fix/post/americans-elect-and-the-death-of-the-third-party-movement/2012/05/17/gIQAIzNKXU_blog.html.  
198. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Election Fraud and the Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 896–97 (2007); Steve LeBlanc, Marriage 
Backers, Foes, Point Fingers: Gay-Nuptials Ban Spawns Nastiness, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 19, 2005), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/10/19/marriage_backers_foes_point_fingers. 
Petition signature fraud has long been asserted and documented. In 1874, a Kansas court rejected a petition on 
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they are arguably exacerbated by these new petitioning realities. 199 
Responding to fears of fraud and to the problem of pay-to-play petition signature 
gathering, some states have begun to explore whether technology might be deployed as 
a possible fix.200 If petitions can be signed online, cutting out the middleman, the paid 
petition circulator problem and many of the attendant fraud issues dissipate. While 
online petitioning is prohibited outright by statute in several states,201 the increased use 
of technology to improve the process seems inevitable. We are unsurprisingly 
witnessing a growing movement to press states and municipalities to permit online 
official petitioning. 
California was one of the first states to explore online official petitioning. In 2008, 
a proposal in California to allow online circulation for initiative petitions prompted the 
California-based Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) to evaluate the use of online 
official petitions.202 CGS weighed the possibility of using “digital signatures” approved 
by the Secretary of State, plus a separate unique identifier sent to the voter by the 
Secretary of State, as a means of verifying online official petition signatures.203 
Although it cited security concerns, CGS found “no reason to believe that the problems 
of coercion or signature selling would be any greater for online signatures than for 
handwritten signatures on petitions circulated door-to-door or at shopping malls.”204 On 
the other hand, critics of the proposal worried online petition signing might make the 
initiative process too accessible by lowering the cost of participation so dramatically.205 
Ballot initiatives already overwhelm California voters; an easier process might make 
the number of initiatives not only unwieldy but contrary to the idea of representative 
government.206 
By 2010, a California firm called Verafirma developed signature gathering 
 
which over 600 names “were names of fictitious persons, minors, and non-residents, and names of resident 
electors signed thereto without their knowledge or consent.” Butler v. McMillen, 13 Kan. 385, 386 (1874). In 
1912, an Oregon court found sixty percent of signatures were forged or fraudulent on ballot initiatives. Todd 
Donovan & Daniel A. Smith, Identifying and Preventing Signature Fraud on Ballot Measure Petitions, in 
ELECTION FRAUD: DETECTING AND DETERRING ELECTORAL MANIPULATION 130, 143 n.6 (Michael R. Alvarez 
et al. eds., 2008). In Oklahoma in 1913, seven measures were removed from a ballot due to signature fraud. Id.  
199. See, e.g., Eric Shawn, Indiana Lawmaker: Holder Absent on Petition Fraud Case, FOX NEWS (Dec. 
18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/18/indiana-lawmaker-holder-absent-on-primary-petition-
fraud-case (reporting on a petition fraud in Indiana); Dems Challenge 2008 McCain Petitions, ONPOLITIX (Oct. 
19, 2011), http://indiana.onpolitix.com/news/80737/democrats-challenge-2008-mccain-petitions (discussing 
2008 presidential primary ballot challenges).  
200. See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recent petition verification 
efforts in Wisconsin for one such example. 
201. See, e.g., Running for Office, N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.ny.gov 
/RunningOffice.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (stating that the New York Board of Elections has expressly 
prohibited the use of e-signatures for official purposes).  
202. WALTER S. BAER & ROY ULRICH, ONLINE SIGNATURE GATHERING FOR CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 2–
3 (2008). 
203. Id. at 5–6. 
204. Id. at 9–10. 
205. See id. at 2 (noting that the ease of online petitioning could create a flood of ballot initiatives).  
206. Id. at 14–15. 
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software to enable voters to sign petitions from a computer or smartphone.207 The 
software allowed would-be petition signers to use a touchscreen device to trace their 
signature above their printed name and address after they viewed a copy of a petition 
on their screen.208 The tracings would then appear on an electronic copy of the 
petition.209 Hoping to prompt the State of California to accept e-signatures on petitions, 
Verafirma’s founder, Michael Ni, brought a flash drive to the Board of Elections 
demanding the Board count the image of his signature contained on the drive in support 
of a ballot initiative legalizing marijuana.210 When election officials refused, Ni sued 
for declaratory relief.211 Ni’s tactic did not pay off. The court held that e-signatures did 
not meet the statutory requirement that voters to “personally affix” their signatures on 
petitions.212 For now, online official petitioning looks unlikely in the Golden State. 
California is not the only state to ponder online petitioning. Nebraska considered a 
bill to allow voters to sign petitions online through a secure state election website,213 
but the legislature indefinitely postponed action on the bill in April 2012.214 Utah has 
also toyed with electronic official petitioning. After a state court required state election 
officials to accept electronic signatures,215 the legislature stopped the practice in its 
tracks, passing a law in 2011 that outlawed the use of electronic petition signatures.216 
 




210. Kenneth Ofgang, C.A. Rejects Bid to Count Online Signature on Initiative Petition, METRO. NEWS-
ENTERPRISE, (July 5, 2011), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2011/nixx070511.htm.  
211. Ni v. Slocum, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 622–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
212. Id. at 630. 
213. Legis. B. 566, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).  
214. See NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, 2d Sess., at 1562 (2012). Nebraska State 
Senator Paul Schumaker introduced the bill that would allow petition signers to go onto a website and input 
their name, county of residence, political party affiliation, date of birth, and a unique identifier that could be 
verified against other data. Online Petition Signature Collection Proposed, UNICAMERAL UPDATE (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://update.legislature.ne.gov/?p=3659. The state would then send petition signers a postcard 
confirming his or her signature. Id. Additionally, the bill would provide criminal penalties for fraud. Id. 
215. See Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147, 1155–56 (Utah 2010) (holding that electronic signatures can 
be used to endorse candidate nominating because Utah statute did not require that the signature or other 
information be “personally affixed” to the petition). After the court handed down the decision mandating the 
acceptance of electronic signatures, the Lieutenant Governor Gregory Bell issued a rule requiring that petition 
circulators witness petition signatures. Joseph M. Dougherty, E-Signature Rule May Face Challenge, DESERET 
NEWS, July 11, 2010, at A1. Although Bell stated that organizers could use alternative methods, such as 
Skype, to witness online signers, the rule made it very difficult for organizers to use online signatures. Id. In 
any event, the issue was mooted by the legislature’s action to ban online official petitioning. Robert Gehrke, 
Legislature OKs Ban on E-signatures in Elections, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib /home/51395915-76/ballot-ban-bill-daw.html.csp. 
216. Gehrke, supra note 215. In September, 2012, Utah activists promoted a referendum to overturn S.B. 
165 to allow electronic petition signatures, hoping—ironically—to collect enough signatures to get on the 
ballot in November 2012. David Montero, Cook Asks Supreme Court to Save Ballot Initiative, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Sept. 8, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/54842717-90/ballot-case-cook-court.html.csp. Even 
more ironically, activists failed to collect enough signatures to place the measure on the ballot in 2012. See 
David Montero, Judge Rules Against Foes of Utah’s Initiative Law, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 2, 2012, 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/54806753-78/ballot-cook-law-court.html.csp. (noting that activists were so 
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Montana has also addressed the e-signature question and seems amenable to the idea.217 
But the most interesting action in online petitioning is taking place in Maryland. 
In 2011, organizers of a Maryland petition undertook a referendum opposing the state’s 
DREAM Act.218 To collect those signatures, Republican State Delegate Neil Parrott 
created a website called MDPetitions.com.219 To use the site, which Parrott promoted 
on talk radio and other news outlets,220 voters enter basic information, including first 
and last name, email address, phone number, date of birth, and zip code.221 The site 
then displays the name of the user entering the information, plus the names of all the 
members of his or her household.222 The site directs the user to check a box next to the 
names of all members of the household willing to sign the petition.223 The site then 
directs the user to download the petition, at which point MDPetitions software 
generates a petition form, populated with names and required information of all 
individuals in the household, and space for each to sign.224 Voters then print the 
petition form, sign it (and have other household members sign).225 The printed form 
also includes a separate section on which the signer signs and dates the form as the 
circulator (i.e., the signer acts as his or her own witness/circulator).226 Signers then 
must send their completed petition forms via mail to MDPetitions in Funkstown, 
MD.227 The organization then amasses the printouts and delivers them to the State 
Board of Elections for certification.228 
During the DREAM Act petition effort, the Maryland ACLU and other groups 
challenged the validity of online signatures, voicing concern that the system contained 
insufficient checks to detect fraud.229 The State Board of Elections, however, opted to 
 
many signatures short, they would not be able to gather enough signatures before the deadline to place it on the 
ballot). 
217. In the wake of the Utah electronic petition signature controversy, the Montana Attorney General’s 
office issued an advisory letter noting that because of the structure of Montana’s adoption of the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (different from the version adopted in Utah), the state’s Board of Election 
maintains discretion to count e-signatures. Letter of Advice from J. Stuart Segrest, Montana Assistant Attorney 
General, to Linda McCulloch, Montana Secretary of State (July 25, 2011). 
218. S. 167, 2011 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011). The Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors 
(DREAM) Act would have provided conditional permanent residency to certain illegal aliens, most recently 
approved by the governor in May 2011. David Hill, Petitioners Boasting 100,000 Signatures; Dream Act Foes 
Put Law on Hold, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A16. Opponents submitted enough signatures to delay the 
enactment of the bill. Id.  
219. Camille Eslick, Petitioning Goes Online: Initiative and Referendum Consultants See Potential in 
the Drive for Verified Signatures Online, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, July/Aug. 2011, at 48–49. 
220. Id. at 49. 
221. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, No. 
02-C-12-171365 (Md. Cir. Ct. for Anne Arundel Cnty. Aug. 10, 2012). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 9–10. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 9. 
228. For the successful DREAM Act petition, Parrott ultimately collected about one-third of his petition 
signatures online. Eslick, supra note 219, at 48–49.  
229. David Hill, State ACLU Challenges E-Signature Petitions: Says Dream Act Vote Website Violates 
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certify the electronic signatures and has blessed the collection of petition signatures in 
this fashion.230 Since that time, the MDPetitions website has expanded to include a 
variety of petitioning efforts.231 
In July 2012, the Maryland State Democratic Committee, responding to 
MDPetitions’s effort to put a redistricting map on the general election ballot in 
November 2012,232 challenged the collection of online signatures in the Circuit Court 
for Anne Arundel County.233 The complaint alleged that the online petition process 
encourages fraud because signers witness their own signature.234 In addition, the 
complaint argued that signatures collected online should be invalidated because 
MDPetitions pre-fills the petition forms in violation of a Maryland statute that plaintiffs 
claimed required each signer to complete him or herself.235 Ultimately, the court upheld 
the online petitioning process, ruling the practice meets Maryland statutory 
requirements.236 
Maryland’s online petition system has huge advantages for political organizers 
seeking to gather signatures.237 Rather than standing on street corners trying randomly 
to identify those who may or may not be sympathetic to their political position, 
organizers only have to direct known supporters to a website. Political organizers can 
purchase targeted lists from companies described above to increase their chances of 
targeting sympathetic eyeballs and can construct pinpointed email and social media 
campaigns to proposition likely signers.238  
By cutting out the middleman, Maryland’s new method alters the privacy 
paradigm. In Maryland, one can now sign an official petition from the privacy of one’s 
own home without a grocery store sidewalk interaction or other public interface. 
 
the Law, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 2011, at A15. Opponents of ACLU’s position noted that the MD ACLU’s 
arguments were undercut by the Utah ACLU’s support of online petitioning. Id. 
230. The immigrant advocacy group Casa de Maryland later dropped its challenge to the validity of the 
signatures. David Hill, Immigrant Group Drops Petition Challenge, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at A16. The 
challenge was in some ways a losing battle since the Maryland election board determined the group had 
collected nearly 109,000 valid voter signatures, roughly double the 55,736 signatures needed. See David Hill, 
Immigrant Group Sues to Uphold Dream Act, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A14 (reporting on invalidated 
petition signatures, leaving petitioners 4,000 signatures short of the threshold).  
231. See MDPETITIONS.COM, http://www.mdpetitions.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (adding 
redistricting and same-sex marriage to the list of successful petitions). 
232. Pursuant to Maryland Constitution, voters can refer an act passed by the General Assembly to 
referendum by voters if they collect a petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal to three percent of 
the whole number of votes cast for Governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election. MD. CONST. art. 
XVI, § 3. 
233. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 221, at 2. 
234. Id. at 12–13. 
235. See MD. CODE REGS. 33.06.03.06(B) (2012) (stating that “each signer shall . . . (2) Provide the 
following information, to be printed or typed in the appropriate spaces: (a) Date of signing, (b) Signer’s name 
as it was signed, and (c) Current residence address, including house number, street name, apartment number (if 
applicable), town, and ZIP code”).  
236. Whitley v. Maryland State Bd. of Elections, No. 02-C-12-171365 (Md. Cir. Ct. for Anne Arundel 
Cnty. Aug. 10, 2012), aff’d 50 A.3d 9 (Md. 2012).  
237. BAER & ULRICH, supra note 202, at 2.  
238. See Duhigg, supra note 115 (explaining how companies use personal information they acquire to 
target potential customers).  
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Though the signature must still be sent to the group organizing the petition drive, 
Americans are used to sending confidential documents through the mail—it feels more 
private than a face-to-face interaction. This development, if it is mimicked in other 
states, could radically alter our subjective experience of political privacy in official 
petitioning that mirrors subjective privacy expectations in the popular petitioning 
realm. 
While MDPetitions may enhance signers’ subjective sense of privacy, that 
security is misplaced. Data about the activities of Maryland’s petitioning public has 
never been more carefully catalogued or more freely available.239 Once an organization 
has collected signatures (online or on paper), those signatures are delivered to the 
Maryland State Board of Elections for verification.240 In many states—particularly 
larger ones—the petition signature verification process consists of random spot checks, 
leaving the onus on those opposed to a petition to prove the documents contained 
invalid signatures.241 In Maryland, however, not only is every signature verified,242 but 
the fact of one’s signing a petition becomes a permanent record on the state’s voter 
registry.243 As required under the Help America Vote Act, Maryland created a 
centralized voter registry called the Statewide Voter Registration System 
(MDVOTERS).244 MDVOTERS, in addition to creating a central voter registry, also 
includes features for coding individual names with information about petitioning 
activity.245 Election officials now verify petition signatures on MDVOTERS by adding 
a code beside each signer’s name indicating which petitions that voter signed, whether 
or not officials deemed the signature valid, and if invalid, the reason the signature 
failed to pass muster.246 
 
239. But see infra note 251 and accompanying text for a description of the 2013 legislative efforts to 
curb access to petition data in Maryland.  
240. Historically, petition organizers submitted petitions grouped by county so that the Maryland State 
Board could then farm signature sheets out to individual counties for verification. Telephone Interview with 
Jared DeMarinis, Director, Division of Candidacy and Campaign Finance, Maryland State Board of Elections 
(Aug. 3, 2012). The State Board still maintains the practice of sending forms to counties to verify, but this 
practice is no longer necessary from a practical standpoint because Maryland’s voter registry is now 
centralized. Id.  
241. For example, in the State of Washington, the secretary of state has the burden. See WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 29A.72.230 (West 2012) (“The secretary of state may use any statistical sampling techniques for 
this verification and canvass which have been adopted by rule as provided by chapter 34.05 RCW.”).  
242. At least until the required threshold is reached. 
243. If the signature verification process determines that the required number of valid signatures have 
been collected, the remaining signatures may go unverified and uncoded. Telephone Interview with Jared 
DeMarinis, supra note 240.  
244. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“[E]ach State, acting through the chief State election official, 
shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, 
interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State 
level that contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State and 
assigns a unique identifier to each legally registered voter in the State . . . .”). Previously, individual Maryland 
counties had been responsible for maintaining their own voter lists. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Managing 
Maryland Elections, MD. B. J., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 2, 7. 
245. MD. ST. BOARD OF ELECTIONS, PETITION ACCEPTANCE AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES 2–6 
(2012). 
246. For example, “NS” if the name is not written in standard form; “DUP” if the name is duplicated on 
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As a result of its digitized system, the state board can generate lists of individuals 
who have signed specific petitions, lists of individuals whose names have been 
validated or invalidated for signing specific petitions, and the reasons for 
disqualification. Should a member of the public request, the board can generate a list of 
all the petitions a specific voter or group of voters has signed. The result is a substantial 
loss of political obscurity in Maryland. In the past, it would have been very difficult to 
ferret out the names of petition signers, and even harder (if not impossible) to 
determine what petitions a particular individual had signed. Now the process may 
unfold with a few strikes on a keyboard. 
Political organizers will enjoy benefits from decreased political obscurity. 
Although MDPetitions could dramatically impact the signature-gathering industry’s 
bottom line, some in the industry praise the idea because the process promises better 
political data. Observed one petition signature gathering consultant of Maryland’s 
online petitioning, “[i]f voters go out of their way to fill out, print and then mail their 
petition signature, the quality of the signers is better, meaning a richer database to call 
upon down the road.”247  
Unsurprisingly, following KnowThyNeighbor.org’s lead, a prominent LGBT 
newspaper in Washington, D.C., The Washington Blade, uploaded a searchable list of 
the names and addresses of those who signed the Maryland anti–gay marriage petition, 
again cross-referencing Google Maps to allow individuals the ability to figure out who 
had signed in their locality.248 Some hailed the move as a means of assuring political 
accountability in Maryland; others were less sure.249  
 
another signature page; “CG” if the signer signed via computer generated petition; and “SI” for failure to 
provide signature or address. Id. at 8. Note that Maryland’s digitizing of petition signatures resulted in 
confusion on Election Day in 2012. When Marylanders signed petitions using a different address than what 
appears on their voter registration, the discrepancy prevented voters from casting a regular ballot. See Erin 
Cox, Officials Investigate Long Lines at Polls: Area Voters Dissatisfied by Extended Waits, Names Missing 
from Rolls, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 8, 2012, at 2A (describing Maryland resident Christopher Lochner who, 
having signed a petition using a different address than his voter registration address, was forced to vote 
provisionally). Maryland legislators responded by introducing a bill in January 2013 that would require signers 
to use the same address as on their voter registration, and would prevent the state board from using petition 
addresses to update voter registration records. See H.D. 493, 2013 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2013).  
247. Eslick, supra note 219, at 49.  
248. WBadmin, Who Signed the Md. Anti-Gay Marriage Petition?, WASH. BLADE (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/07/25/who-signed-the-md-anti-gay-marriage-petition/. 
249. Tom Lang, Director of KnowThyNeighbor.org, commented on the Washington Blade piece:  
To LGBT and allies, look to signers in Maryland and you will find friends and family members, 
people you employ and owners of establishments you patronize. Now and in the years to come, you 
will find also, politicians running for office who may or may not have a good enough answer as to 
why he or she signed this initiative to take away rights. And know . . . once you see names your 
[sic] recognize . . . your true work begins. 
Tom Lang, Comment to Who Signed the Md. Anti-Gay Marriage Petition?, WASH. BLADE (July 25, 2012, 3:19 
PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/07/25/who-signed-the-md-anti-gay-marriage-petition/#comment-
59345. Another commenter was less sure: 
[P]ublishing people who signed it does bother me. I think we need to encourage people to be part of 
the democratic process and posting their information sets them up for their rights to be violated, and 
let’s be honest we are all suppose [sic] to be supporting equal rights for all and not targeting 
individuals who disagree with us or we are NO better. 
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The loss of political obscurity for Maryland petition signers had real 
consequences in 2012. In one prominent example, a Maryland university placed its 
chief diversity officer on administrative leave after learning online that she had signed 
the anti–gay marriage petition.250 But aside from this high-profile example, the real 
question is whether Maryland petition signers will now think twice before adding their 
name to petitioning efforts in a climate in which political obscurity in petition signing 
is effectively gone. It seems the Maryland legislature is concerned. In its 2013 session, 
members are considering a slew of bills that would curb both online petitioning and 
disclosure of petition signatures.251  
In both the popular and official realm, signing a petition today potentially exposes 
individuals to a form of state political cataloguing on a scale, in formats, and for 
purposes never contemplated by the authors of our democracy. The Internet has shaken 
the traditional balance between protecting political obscurity and requiring public 
accountability. Unless courts, legislatures, and administrators recognize the state’s role 
in shaping this reality and take steps to recalibrate the balance, participation in official 
petitioning is threatened. The next Section explores what might be done. 
V. PROTECTING POLITICAL OBSCURITY IN MODERN OFFICIAL PETITIONING 
The nominally public nature of official petition signing should not negate an 
individual’s interest in maintaining political obscurity in a modern age when 
information is fluid, amplified, and permanent. After its foray into more 
technologically creative petitioning practices, Maryland may choose to move in the 
direction of a state known for protecting the privacy of its citizens: California.252 
California takes a particularly protective view of official petition signer privacy. In 
California, only named proponents of official petitions are entitled to examine 
signatures to ascertain which the Secretary of State disqualified and the reason(s) for 
disqualification.253 The right of examination exists only for a twenty-one-day period 
after certification of insufficiency of signatures.254 Review of petition signatures is not 
 
James, Comment to Who Signed the Md. Anti-Gay Marriage Petition?, WASH. BLADE (July 31, 2012, 5:13 
PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/07/25/who-signed-the-md-anti-gay-marriage-petition/#comment-
60400.  
250. Joan Frawley Desmond, Targeted Public Disclosure Laws? Opponents of Same Sex Marriage Feel 
the Heat, NAT’L CATHOLIC REG. (Oct. 31, 2012 2:11 PM), http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/targeted-by-
public-disclosure-laws. The university reinstated the diversity officer three months later in January 2013. 
Angela McCaskill Reinstated: Gallaudet University Diversity Officer Returns Three Months After Signing 
Anti-Gay Marriage Petition, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/01/08/angela-mccaskill-reinstated-gallaudet_n_2432838.html. 
251. See, e.g., Referendum Integrity Act, H.B 493, 2013 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2013) (making online 
petition signature gathering more difficult by placing restrictions on who can circulate an online petition and 
what that petition must contain); H.B. 49, 2013 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2013) (allowing public inspection of 
signatures “to facilitate judicial review of a determination concerning the sufficiency of the petition 
[signatures],” but forbidding the state otherwise from releasing personal information contained in a petition to 
the general public). 
252. Margaret Betzel, Comment, Privacy Law Developments in California, 2 ISJLP 831, 831 (2006) 
(noting that “California has led the nation in the development of privacy laws”). 
253. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253.5 (West 2012); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11301. 
254. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253.5. 
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available to the public generally, including those who signed the petition.255 California 
statute further renders accessing petition signatures for use other than the original 
purpose, a misdemeanor.256 Most states are far less protective of petition signer 
privacy. Wisconsin, at the other end of the spectrum, has, in the case of the high-profile 
Scott Walker recall, affirmatively posted petition signature pages on a government 
website.257 Most states, however, fall in between these two extremes, allowing public 
access to petition signatures through public records requests. The extent to which states 
should re-examine these rules to take into account the changed information technology 
landscape is the question to which this Section now turns. 
Official petitioning custodianship is difficult. But official petitions are not the first 
type of public document to face the challenge of digital dissemination of information. 
Court records provide an example of a public document system that has undergone 
great transformation in the last decade.258 Just like official petitions, court records are 
also presumed to be public.259 But the right of public access to court records has 
historically been greatly limited by practical realities. Before the Internet, “members of 
the public had no choice but to trudge to the courthouse to obtain access to records 
from the clerk.”260 Beginning in the early 1990s, judges and court administrators 
confronted the reality that public court records could be made easily available to the 
public on the Internet.261 Since then, policymakers have debated whether court access 
policies should be altered in light of new and changing technological realities.262 Many 
have argued that “‘public is public’—i.e., if a document is public, it should be made 
available online as well.”263 The “public is public” camp believes that giving the public 
 
255. Id. 
256. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18650. 
257. See, e.g., Home: Recall Petitions, WISC. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., https://webapps.wi.gov/sites 
/recall/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (providing signature pages for Wisconsin recall petitions).  
258. Alan Carlson, Public Access to Court Records: Reducing the Risk of Disclosure of Personally 
Identifiable Information, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2007 19, 19 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2007). 
259. Despite an absence of explicit language in the Constitution guaranteeing public access to records, 
the right of access stems from the historical evolution of the justice system. Since the time of the Norman 
Conquest, open access to trials served a fundamental set of purposes, such as discouraging perjury and 
misconduct and ensuring against biased decision making. Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, 
Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 
46 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (1996). The presumption of openness is not limited to the criminal context. While no 
constitutional proclamation safeguards the access to civil proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
common law right of access to civil proceedings as well. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 
1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding a right of public access to civil trials). Building on this history of openness is the 
public’s right to “inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” 
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted).  
260. Rebecca Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 237, 
258–59 (2010).  
261. Id. 
262. From January 2001 to July 2002, an advisory panel created by the National Center for State Courts 
met to study access to electronic court records and develop model guidelines to be applied to state court 
systems. Martha Wade Steketee & Alan Carlson, Privacy and Public Access to Court Records: Public and 
Private Dimensions Create a Diverse Group of Collaborators, in 2002 REPORT ON TRENDS IN THE STATE 
COURTS 23, 23 (2002).  
263. Hulse, supra note 260, at 259.  
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more meaningful and convenient access through the Internet upholds and forwards the 
values that underlie transparency and the presumption of openness.264  
Others believe that amplified online access to court records demands a major shift 
in policy and practice. Privacy interests of litigants (and nonlitigants, such as 
witnesses) once protected by dusty and hard-to-access court files would be thrust out 
there for all to see if posted online, requiring new policies to protect litigants’ privacy 
interests in this new information landscape.265 
Following the conversion from paper to electronic records in the 1990s, some 
jurisdictions put digitized court records online in wholesale fashion. Since the 
underlying documents are public, like the signatures in Doe v. Reed, the move seemed 
like a no-brainer.266 In some cases, however, wholesale online publication of public 
court records proved disastrous.267 An example from Oklahoma is illustrative. In early 
March 2008, following “public is public” reasoning, Oklahoma court administrators 
elected to place nearly nine million unredacted public court records online.268 
Unsurprisingly, administrators quickly faced harsh criticism when members of the 
media discovered Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable 
information of various Oklahoma public figures on the court’s website.269 A few weeks 
later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reacted, adopting rules that flatly prohibited online 
 
264. Id. This is largely the approach taken by the federal judiciary. See PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (providing electronic public access 
service to case and docket information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts). One reason that 
the federal judiciary had less to fear from putting records directly online may be that the most sensitive 
personal data found in court records systems—family and juvenile cases, for example—are heard 
predominantly at the state level. See Hulse, supra note 260, at 267–68 (explaining that most state court records 
are not usually available online, with only basic docket information such as the names of the parties available 
electronically); Winn, supra note 29, at 148–49 (explaining the state court system’s preference for solving the 
disputes and helping the parties rather than serving an abstract public interest). The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press usefully compiles a list of electronically accessible records for each state. State-by-State 
Guide, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/access-electronic-
communications/state-state-guide (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
265. See Winn, supra note 29, at 138 (stating that judges at times have access to highly confidential 
information that should not be made public).  
266. PACER’s pay wall restores some measure of practical obscurity. See infra note 278 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Pacer and the digitization court records.  
267. See Winn, supra note 29, at 151 (discussing audit of PACER documents revealed unredacted social 
security numbers on hundreds of in-court pleadings).  
268. Mike McCarville, MCCARVILLE REPORT ONLINE (Mar. 11, 2008, 3:52 PM), 
http://wwwtmrcom.blogspot.com/2008/03/oklahoma-county-clerks-records-reveal.html. 
269. See id. (quoting an article from The Oklahoman that discussed Oklahoma County Clerk Carolynn 
Caudill’s efforts to make all county records available online). 
Almost all of some 8.7 million documents—17 million pages—are online, from mortgage 
documents, mineral deeds, liens and other legal ‘papers,’ from original land patents granted after the 
Land Run of 1889 to last week’s property deals, said Mark Mishoe, chief deputy for County Clerk 
Carolynn Caudill . . . . The conversion cost about $2.5 million—from a $5 fee assessed since 2000 
on most documents filed. 
Id. See also John Greiner, High Court Backs Off Secrecy Rules, OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1 
(discussing the Oklahoma Supreme Court as stating their holding as an attempt to balance the privacy rights of 
individuals and public access to court documents).  
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access to court records.270 Many other states have struggled with this issue, thinking 
twice about making records too available online.271 
Most courts, however, have refrained putting records online wholesale, in an 
attempt to retain some measure of practical obscurity in court records. Over the course 
of the past decade, courts and judicial administrators have developed inventive 
strategies that move away from an open/closed, public/private dichotomy. Many have 
explored the difficult question of redaction.272 Others have looked at making only some 
portions of the court file available online.273 
One of the more interesting approaches is the formation of an entirely new 
category of access termed “courthouse-only.”274 Some courts have determined that 
certain court records (or information contained within those documents) are, either by 
courthouse rule, state statute, or in rare instances by federal statute,275 inappropriate for 
release on the Internet, even though that same document or the information within it is 
publicly available at the courthouse.276 Courts maintaining a “courthouse-only” 
 
270. Greiner, supra note 269. A few weeks later, on March 25, 2008, under fire from access advocates, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court withdrew the order to “give the issue further study and consideration.” Id. Since 
2008, Oklahoma has moved to revise its policy. See Omer Gillham, Tulsa County Begins Posting Court 
Documents Online, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 27, 2011, at A11 (discussing the Oklahoma Supreme Court approval 
of rules clarifying when identifiers such as birth dates, home addresses, and Social Security numbers will be 
redacted).  
271. For example, in 2010, fearing that too much sensitive private information from court records was 
finding its way online, a Montana state law librarian filed a petition with the state supreme court asking that 
the presumption of openness be overturned. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and suspended the 
presumption of openness. In re Temporarily Suspending the Rules for Privacy and Public Access to Court 
Records in Montana, No. AF 06-0377 (Mont. Sept. 14, 2011).  
272. Court redaction software has become a cottage industry as private companies seek to provide a 
technological fix to the problem of retroactively redacting public court records. Laura Gater, Intelligent 
Redaction Technology, COMPUTING SYS. INNOVATIONS, May/June 2005, http://www.csisoft.com 
/applications/courts_today_article.pdf. It has in many ways been an uphill battle. A 2008 audit of the federal 
judiciary’s PACER system revealed more than 1600 cases with redaction failures. Timothy B. Lee, Studying 
the Frequency of Redaction Failures in PACER, FREEDOM TO TINKER (May 25, 2011), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/blog/tblee/studying-frequency-redaction-failures-pacer.  
273. For example, states like Washington have experimented with the “confidential coversheet” 
approach. In family law and guardianship cases, all sensitive personal information is placed on a confidential 
coversheet that is not released to the public, online or otherwise, even if the rest of the file is publicly 
accessible. See WASH. GEN. APPLICATION CT. R. 22(e) (explaining that the confidential cover sheet will be 
under the seal of the court). Some are pursuing sophisticated technological approaches that would place 
information within court records in separate fields that could be coded with catered privacy protections. See 
Diana Graski & Thomas M. Clarke, Automating the Enforcement of Privacy Policies, in FUTURE TRENDS IN 
STATE COURTS 2012 155, 157 (Carol Flango et al. eds., 2012) (stating there are multiple benefits to acquiring 
sophisticated technology to code documents).  
274. Carlson, supra note 258, at 20.  
275. For example, the Violence Against Women Act prohibits the publication on the Internet of 
identifying information in protective orders and restraining orders. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(d)(3) (2006) (“A State, 
Indian tribe, or territory shall not make available publicly on the Internet any information regarding the 
registration, filing of a petition for, or issuance of a protection order, restraining order or injunction . . . in 
either the issuing or enforcing State, tribal or territorial jurisdiction, if such publication would be likely to 
publicly reveal the identity or location of the party protected under such order.”). 
276. The Conference of Chief Justices/Conference of State Courts Administrators Guidelines suggest 
such an approach in section 4.50. Carlson, supra note 258, at 20. A 2007 survey indicated that twelve out of 
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approach will often provide a computer kiosk (or several) in the clerk’s office at which 
the public can search for the record sought.277 Members of the public still enjoy the 
efficiencies of digital records, but must expend effort to access those records by making 
the trip to the courthouse.278 The strategy is similar to a municipality installing a speed 
bump. Here, rather than slowing cars down, the attempt is to restore some measure of 
practical obscurity.279 Doing so has been critically important in the court records 
context. The fear, voiced by many in the judiciary and made real by the dramatic rise in 
the use of “private justice” mechanisms to escape public glare, is that the public will 
shy away from using courts to resolve disputes.280 In the case of court records, the 
arrival of the Internet has forced judges and court administrators to rethink old black-
and-white policies, and in some instances, install speed bumps to restore practical 
obscurity. 
Speed bumps are needed to ensure political obscurity in the petitioning context as 
well. Rather than adopting a “public is public” approach, releasing petition signatures 
and identifying information in full, legislatures and state administrative agencies 
responsible for managing the official petitioning process should explore policies that 
reflect changing data-privacy realities. If transparency and integrity of the petitioning 
 
twenty-two courts reviewed employed the courthouse-only strategy. Id.  
277. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, ELECTRONIC ACCESS POLICY FOR CIRCUIT 
COURT RECORDS OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS § 4.30 (2004) (listing items that, while public, are not made 
available in electronic form but may be accessed at the office of the clerk of court). Note that the “courthouse-
only” option is enshrined in the CCJ/COSCA Model Policy for access to electronic court records. Carlson, 
supra note 258, at 20.  
278. The fluidity of data today, however, complicates easy fixes. For example, the federal digital court 
records site PACER put court records behind a pay wall. Registering its opposition to the PACER charges for 
access to public court records, an organization called RECAP enabled PACER users to download accessed 
documents to a site where those public documents were available for free. About, RECAP, 
https://www.recapthelaw.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). It would be similarly possible to circumvent 
“courthouse only” policies by simply sending someone to the courthouse to download records and then post 
those records online. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency tried to get around this problem by 
creating “reading rooms.” Letter from John B. Stephenson, Director, GAO Natural Resources & Environment, 
to W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, House of Representatives & John Shimkus, House of Representatives 3 (March 14, 
2003). The chemical manufacturing industry is required to report information to the federal government. Id. 
After 9/11, many worried that making such documents available to the public posed national security risks. Id. 
Others maintained that access to this information was crucial to providing public oversight of the industry. As 
a compromise, the EPA created special reading rooms, in which individuals “may read facility . . . information, 
but may not mechanically reproduce or remove this information from the reading room.” Id.  
279. Many people still fly over speed bumps, undaunted. The same is true of course in the case of court 
records. Once information is made public, it is often very difficult to stop it from spilling out onto the Internet. 
See, e.g., About, supra note 278 (serving as an example of court records being posted on the Internet once they 
are made public).  
280. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun 
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 465 (2006) (finding “increased 
transparency in civil litigation may have wrought an unintended and unwelcome consequence—the diversion 
of more civil disputes into alternative dispute resolution proceedings like arbitration, where the public is ‘shut 
out of information almost completely’” (quoting Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law 
and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20 (2001))); Stephanie Brenowitz, Note, Deadly Secrecy: The Erosion of 
Public Information Under Private Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 679 (2004) (demonstrating how 
public access to important information under traditional litigation is being eroded by private judicial 
mechanisms).  
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process is the goal, wholesale posting of petitions online may not be the best means of 
promoting it.281 Why not permit the public to inspect copies of petition signatures at 
computer kiosks maintained at the state agency responsible for administering the 
petitioning process? For a relatively low cost, states could provide concerned citizens 
with a mechanism to review not just the names of petition signers, but also images of 
the signatures themselves. The state could provide automated tools by which citizens 
could cross-reference signatures with the state’s voter registration database in addition 
to any number of other applications that might assist members of the public in 
verifying the validity of petition signatures far short of the crude mechanism of posting 
wholesale online.282 The government can and should do better, using modern tools at 
its disposal, to give the public an efficient means to oversee the petitioning process.283 
In addition to these speed bumps, states could take a cue from online popular 
petitioning sites to protect signer obscurity. For example, signers of petitions could 
 
281. Any move to restrict access outright to petition signatures is undesirable as a policy matter, given 
the need for transparency and oversight in petitioning, and because doing so violates the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that portion of site listing the names and addresses of doctors who perform 
abortions enjoys First Amendment protection); Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1250 
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (finding Florida statute proscribing publication of police officer’s home address or telephone 
number violated First Amendment); United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 
2004) (finding that blocking a website containing publicly accessed information about government informants 
would violate First Amendment). However, just because information is public does not mean that the most 
convenient method of access is required. See U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 779–80 (1989) (holding disclosure of an FBI rap sheet to a third party “could reasonably 
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
435 U.S. 589, 609–11 (1978) (holding that press is not entitled to tapes containing incriminating recordings of 
Nixon’s voice played in open court and provided to the press in transcript form). 
282. In his dissent in Reed, Justice Thomas suggested that technology might be deployed to protect the 
privacy interests of petition signers while still ensuring the integrity of submitted petitions. Doe v. Reed, 130 
S.Ct. 2811, 2840–41 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, his solutions did not include using technology 
to enhance public oversight that would allow citizens to access the signatures. He instead suggested that 
technology might be used to help the Secretary of State better vet petitions. See id. (“Washington . . . could put 
the names and addresses of referendum signers into a[n] . . . electronic database that state employees could 
search without subjecting the name and address of each signer to wholesale public disclosure. The secretary 
could electronically cross-reference the referendum database against the ‘statewide voter registration list’ 
contained in Washington’s ‘statewide voter registration database’ . . . to ensure that each referendum signer 
meets Washington’s residency and voter registration requirements. . . . An electronic referendum database 
would also enable the secretary to determine whether multiple entries correspond to a single registered voter, 
thereby detecting whether a voter had signed the petition more than once.”). Thomas also suggested a system 
by which individual voters could log onto a website, enter a unique identifier, and confirm that his or her own 
name had not been fraudulently signed. Id. at 2841. As for citizen oversight, Thomas was satisfied with 
Washington’s system for allowing two observers for each side to look on during the Secretary of State’s 
verification process “so long as they make no record of the names, addresses, or other information on the 
petitions or related records.” Id.  
283. A cynic might point out that anyone could go to such a kiosk and simply copy out the names and 
addresses by hand, digitize the information, and spread signers’ names far and wide. This is undoubtedly true. 
And that may happen. However, making it harder to access petition signatures online will result in this 
happening less, and only with great effort and expense. The hope is that by instituting systems that at least 
make it harder to let the toothpaste out of the tube in the first place, some degree of political obscurity may be 
maintained. 
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indicate their preference to share their name publicly when signing. Petitions could 
include a box giving signers the option to have a public listing of just their first name 
and last initial. For oversight purposes, those who require access to the full set of 
signatures and identifying information would still have access, but would be required to 
expend effort and would encounter speed bumps (as well as oversight-enhancing tools) 
using the mechanisms described above.  
Finally, state agencies responsible for processing petition signatures might also 
consider disaggregating the privacy rights of petition signers depending on the type of 
petition at issue. There is an argument, for example, that recall petitions might 
implicate privacy interests of petition signers more than, say, candidate ballot access 
petitions, particularly in small jurisdictions. Perhaps state administrators might consider 
California-level restrictions appropriate for such petitions. The 2012 Wisconsin recall 
effort provides fodder for the idea. Rumors of petition fraud in the attempted 2012 
recall of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker were so widespread that the Wisconsin 
Government Accountability Board (WGAB) undertook the innovative strategy of live-
streaming the signature validation process on its website to allow members of the 
public to watch online.284 In addition, the WGAB voted to make the petitions available 
online, creating a website at which members of the public could view the scanned 
petition pages and search for petition signers by name.285 The website did not allow 
members of the public to search by address. According to the website, “[t]he petitions 
are not address-searchable because addresses were not data-entered due to time and 
cost considerations.”286 Whether due to cost considerations or not, the inability to 
search by locality protected a measure of signers’ political obscurity.  
The idea of posting the signatures online met great criticism from advocacy 
groups concerned about the privacy of certain individuals, for example victims of 
domestic violence whose names and addresses would be exposed as a result of online 
release.287 After weighing these concerns, the WGAB director and general counsel 
decided to release the signatures online nevertheless. The director emphasized the 
public nature of petition signing, explaining that, “[f]ew processes in the electoral 
system or elsewhere are more public than the signing of recall petitions against state-
elected officials . . . . Petition signers chose to participate in the public process of 
initiating a recall election of the governor as well as other officeholders.”288 Not 
surprisingly, given the fervor surrounding the recall effort, the website was 
immediately swamped.289 It seems likely that many, if not most, viewed the site to 
 
284. Recall Election Information, WISC. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., http://gab.wi.gov/elections-
voting/recall (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
285. 2012 Recall Petitions and Challenges, WISC. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD., 
http://gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/recall/petitions (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); Recall, WISC. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY BD., https://webapps.wi.gov/sites/recall/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
286. 2012 Recall Petitions and Challenges, supra note 285.  
287. See Clay Barbour, GAB Posts Petitions Online: The Move Comes Despite Concerns that Residents 
Who Were Victims of Abuse or Assault May Be Put in Danger, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 1, 2012, at A1 (discussing how 
making names and addresses of those who signed the petition unconditionally available to the public could 
create problems for victims of sexual or physical abuse).  
288. Id. (quoting Kevin Kennedy, WGAB director and general counsel). 
289. Mary Spicuzza, Website of Signatures Swamped: The Searchable Database of Recall Petition 
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satisfy curiosity about who opposed Walker rather than to detect fraud. But even if you 
believe the motivations were purely oversight driven, Wisconsin citizens will now 
likely think twice about signing recall petitions. This potential chill might have been 
avoided had Wisconsin thought through how it might have achieved its transparency 
and oversight goals without compromising political obscurity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problem of waning political obscurity is particularly acute in an area lurking 
in the background of this Article: campaign finance disclosure. In a world in which 
anyone interested can very often find the name, political affiliation, address, 
occupation, and dollar amount of political contributions,290 the question of political 
obscurity is particularly resonant. Will potential donors—at least those who do not 
have the resources to create anonymous donation mechanisms—refrain from 
contributing if political obscurity is lost? Some research suggests the answer is yes.291 
One common observation is that the system is backward. Small donors are forced to 
reveal detailed personal information while larger donors—whose identities arguably 
offer more salient political information—are able to mask their identity.292 A suggested 
fix is to increase minimum dollar reporting requirements so that nominal political 
contributions remain anonymous.293 Bruce Cain intelligently suggests partial disclosure 
for small contributors—for example, occupation and amount, but not name and 
address.294  
In a sense, small political donors and petition signers share much in common. 
Both function essentially as “drops in the bucket” in terms of political impact. And, in 
 
Signers is Overwhelmed Minutes After it’s Rolled Out, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 9, 2012, at A3. 
290. See, e.g., Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://fec.gov/pindex.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (allowing users to see what political candidates people 
are financially supporting); HuffPost Fundrace, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/news/huffpost-fundrace (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (allowing users to search for individual donors by name, 
employer, or zip code); OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (keeping 
track of the amount of money spent on campaigns). 
291. See, e.g., Raymond J. La Raja, Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of 
Transparency on Making Campaign Contributions 1 (November 29, 2012) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202405 (finding that political donors, “refrain from making contributions or reduce 
their donations to avoid disclosing their identities”). 
292. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 286 (2010) 
(arguing that large donors no longer worry about disclosing their donations); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A 
Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 568–70 
(2012) (arguing that the amount of money in the system could cause quid pro quo corruption making it 
necessary to have disclosure laws); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44. IND. L. REV 255, 
280 (2010) (arguing for changes in current disclosure system to prevent retaliation against donors); 
McGeveran, supra note 28, at 859–60 (stating the Supreme Court has found no problems with disclosure of 
modest campaign contributions).  
293. Mayer, supra note 292, at 282–83; see also Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. 
L. J. 1259, 1300–01 (2012) (arguing that campaign contributions of less than $500 be exempt from disclosure).  
294. See Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 
2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-
semi-disclosure/ (noting that there is value in knowing from where a candidate receives money, but no 
informational gain in knowing a specific donor’s name).  
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both cases the state has an interest in encouraging participation; democracy is improved 
the more citizens take part.295 But potential solutions in the political contribution 
context are not transferable to the petition signature context. Verifying the identity and 
validity of all signers is a core purpose of transparency. And, there are no varying 
degrees of signing around which to build thresholds—a person has either signed or has 
not. But the impulse to protect small donors is the same as the impulse to protect 
petition signers: to maintain political obscurity in order to encourage, or at least not 
hamper, political participation.  
Because of the absence of a threshold-based solution, the fix in the petition 
context must be more nuanced. First, courts, legislators, and state administrators must 
acknowledge the value of political obscurity, its fragility in the modern day, and the 
consequences of the state’s role in diminishing it. Doing so may enable courts to move 
beyond outdated distinctions between “public” and “private,” and do away with a 
decades-old harassment formula that fails to acknowledge the real harm at hand. 
Confronting the need to maintain a degree of political obscurity will also force those 
who administer petitions to rethink processes in place and develop methods to respect 
important political privacy rights of petition signers. 
One might argue that such efforts are not worth the bother. As political campaigns 
and other private actors engage in massive voter preference cataloguing, there is an 
argument that petition signature data is spit in the sea of information being gathered 
about individual voter preferences. But, as political data gatherers are increasingly 
recognizing, petition data is a higher value target than the car one drives or the beer one 
drinks.296 States that record petition-signing activities in their publicly accessible voter 
registration databases or affirmatively post petition signatures online in searchable 
format are facilitating exposure in a way not dissimilar to exposing the content of 
voters’ ballots. As custodians of official petitions, states must begin to think more 




295. See Overton, supra note 293, at 1273–88 (“Participation exposes the electorate to a variety of ideas 
and viewpoints, furthers self-government, and enhances the legitimacy of government decisions.”); see also 
McGeveran, supra note 28, at 880 (addressing costs and benefits of disclosure regimes). 
296. Charles Duhigg, Campaigns Mine Personal Lives to Get out the Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at 
A1.  
